Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (2000– )
2016

Bank of America, n.a. v. Samuel D. Adamson and Courtney D.
Adamson and John Doe/Jane Doe/Occupant : Appellees'
Replacement Brief Samuel D. Adamson and Courtney D. Adamson
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons

Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Bank of America v Adamson, No. 20140861 (Utah Supreme Court, 2016).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/3201

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (2000– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

-IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.,
Appellant,
V.

Appellate Case No. 2014 0861
District Court Case No. 140500067

SAMUEL D. ADAMSON AND
COURTNEY D. ADAMSON and
JOHN DOE/JANE DOE/OCCUPANT
Appellees and Defendants.

APPELLEES ' REPLACEMENT BRIEF
SAMUEL D. ADAMSON AND COURTNEY D. ADAMSON
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL
OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, ST. GEORGE DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON COUNTY STATE OF UTAH BY
THE HONORABLE JEFFREY C. WILCOX

John Christian Barlow
Barlow Law PLLC
321 N Mall Drive R290
St. George UT 84770
435-634-1200
jcbrajohnchristianbarlo," .com
Counsel for Defendant Appel!ees

Robert H. Scott
Akerman LLP
170 South Main Street, Suite 950
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1648
801-907-6900
Robr.:rt.scott:'a ,akerman.com
Amy Miller (admitted pro hac vice)
McGuireWoods LLP
2001 K Street N.W., Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006
202-857-1732
am i ller 170mcguirewoods.com
Brian E. Pumphrey (admitted pro hac vice)
McGuire Woods LLP
800 E. Canal Street
Richmond, VA 23219
804-775-7745
bpumphrev,a,mcguircwoods.com
Counsel for Appellant
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

FEB - 2 2016

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

•

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.,
Appellant,

Appellate Case No. 2014 0861
District Court Case No. 140500067

V.

SAMUEL D. ADAMSON AND
COURTNEY D. ADAMSON and
JOHN DOE/JANE DOE/OCCUPANT
Appellees and Defendants.

APPELLEES' REPLACEMENT BRJEF
SAMUEL D. ADAMSON AND COURTNEY D. ADAMSON

•

APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF DTSMLSSAL
OF THE F IFTH JUDICIAL D ISTRICT COURT, ST. GEORGE DEPARTMENT
WASHTNGTON COUNTY STATE OF UTAH BY
THE HONORABLE JEFFREY C. W ILCOX

John Christian Barlow
Barlow Law PLLC
32 1 N Mall Drive R290
St. George UT 84770
435-634-1200
jcb@ johncbristianbario,v.com
Counsel for Defendant Appellees

Robert H. Scott
Akerman LLP
170 South Main Street, Suite 950
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1648
801-907-6900
Robert.scott@akerman.com
Amy M iller (admitted pro hac vice)
McGuire Woods LLP
2001 K Street N .W., Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006
202-857-1732
arnillcr@,mcgu irewoods.com
Brian E. Pumphrey (admitted pro hac vice)
McGu ire Woods LLP
800 E. Canal Street
Richmond, VA 23219
804-775-7745
bpumphrey@mcguirewoods.com
Counsel for Appellant

LIST OF PARTIES

Bank of America N.A. (Appellant)
Distressed Asset Solutions Fund I, LLC (Plaintiff)
Samuel D. Adamson (Appellee/Defendant)
Courtney D. Adamson (Appellee/Defendant)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

JURISDICTION ..................................................................................... !
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED .......................................... !
~

STANDARD OF REVIEW .........................................................................2
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES .................................................................. 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..................................................................... 6

~

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ..................................................................... 8

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ............................................................. 10
ARGUMENT ........................................................................................ 11
I.

THE UTAH STATE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN THEY
INTERPRETED THE TRUST DEED ACT AND RULE THAT THE FORECLOSURE
SALE AND TRUSTEE'S DEED Is VOID AB INITIO. . ............................ 11
A. The Trust Deed Act Is Interpreted As Requiring
Three Elements Before A Proper Foreclosure Sale
Can Be Held And Valid Trustee's Deed Issued. . .................... 12

1. The Creation OfA Trust Relationship. . ........................... 12
~

2. A Qualified Trustee. . ................................................. 13

3. A Valid Trustee Must Adhere To Correct Procedural
Requirements As Stated Under The Code. . ....................... 16
~
1.

The Adamsons have Suffered Great Harm and Prejudice
At The Hands ofBANA and ReconTrust. . ......................... 20

B. The Result Of A Proper Analysis Of The Trust Deed Act
Requires A Finding That The ReconTrust Foreclosure Sale
Trustee's Deed Is Null And Void Ab Initio. . ......................... .21
II.

THE LACK OF A STATUTORILY AUTHORIZED TRUSTEE WITH THE
POWER OF SALE RESULTS IN NOTHING MORE THAN A LIEN ON THE
PROPERTY ........................................................................... 24

11

@

A. Section 57-1-23.5 Authorizes The District Court To Declare The
Foreclosure Sale And Trustees Deed Null And Void Ab Initio ......... 25
III.

BANA Is IGNORING THE FACT THAT RECONTRUST VIOLA TED THE
STATUTES AND Is ASKING THIS COURT To IGNORE STATUTE AND CASE
PRECEDENT. . ............................................................................................. 26

IV.

ADAMSONS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF WAIVER AND
ESTOPPEL BECAUSE THERE WAS NEVER AV ALID FORECLOSURE SALE OR
TRUSTEES DEED ................................................................... 26

V.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERROR IN ITS USE OF LEGAL AUTHORITY
As A MEANS To ILLUSTRATE THE FACT THAT THE TRUSTEES DEED Is
VOID ................................................................................. 27

VI.

BANA's ACTIONS ARE ADVERSE To THE PUBLIC INTEREST ................ 27

@

VII.

THIS COURT CANNOT ENTERTAIN THE ISSUE RAISED IN APPELLANT'S
BRIEF REGARDING THE NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE VOID
TRUSTEE'S DEED BECAUSE THE ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED IN THE
DISTRICT COURT ................................................................... 28

<;>

VIII.

BANA CANNOT PREVAIL BECAUSE THEY ARE PRECLUDED FROM REL YING
UPON THE STATUTE ALLOWING THEM TO FORECLOSE UPON THE REAL
PROPERTY AND OBTAIN A TRUSTEES DEED ................................... 28

IX.

DISTRESSED ASSET Is NOT A BONA FIDE PURCHASER. .. ..................... 28

X.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS. . ....................................................... 29

CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 31
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 24(t)(l) ................................. 30
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................... .30
ADDENDUM ....................................................................................... 33

111

~

TALBLE OF AUTHORITIES
vio

CASES
Am. Falls Canal Sec. Co. V. Am. Sav. & Loan As 'n,
775 P.2d 412,414 (Utah 1989) .................................................................... 27
Beehive Med. Elecs., Inc. v. Indus. Comm 'n,
583 P.2d 53, 60 (Utah 1978) ....................................................................... 14
Bell v. Countrywide Bank, N.A .,
860 F.Supp.2d 1290 (D. Utah 2012) ......................................................... 15, 26

~

Blodgett v. Martch,
590 P .2d 298, 303 (Utah 1978) ............................................................... 14, 19
Coleman v. ReconTrust Co., N.A.,
No. 2:10-cv-1099-DB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138519 (D. Utah Oct. 4, 2011) ............ 12
Concepts Inc., v First Sec Realty Serv. Inc.,
843 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) ............................................ 17, 18, 20, 27
Cox v. ReconTrust Co., N.A.,
No. 2:10-CV-492 CW, 2011 (WL 835893) ................................................ 12, 15
Edwards v. Kearzey,
96 U.S. 595 601, 24 L.Ed 793 (1878) .................................................................. .14

~

Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass 'n v. Sundquist,
311 P.3d 1004, 2013 UT 45 (Utah 2013) ............................................. ......passim
Houston First American Savings v. Musick,
650 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1983) ...................................................................... 17
Fox v. Brigham Young Univ., Inc.,
2007 UT App 406114, 176 P.3d 446 .............................................................2
Hamilton v. Salt Lake City,
106 P.2d 1028, 99 Utah 362 (Utah 1940) ....................................................... 28

~

Hurley v. Town ofBingham,
63 Utah 589,228 P. 213 ............................................................................ 28
Johnson v. City of Glendale,
12 Cal.App.2d 389, 55 P.2d 580 .................................................................. 28
Kleinsmith v. Shurtleff,
571 F.3d 1033 (10th Cir. 2009) ..................................................... .11, 23, 24, 27
lV

Loomis v. Meridias Capital, Inc.,
No. 2:11-cv-363-PMW, 2011 WL 5844304 (D. Utah Nov. 18, 2011) ....................... 12
Lorenzo v. Workforce Appeals Bd.,
2002 UT App 371, 111, 58 P.3d 873 ............................................................ 23
Main I Ltd. P 'ship v. Venture Capital Const. & Dev. Corp.,
154 Ariz. 256,260, 741 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) .............................. 29

w

McQueen v. Jordan Pines Townhomes Owners Ass'n, Inc.,
2013 UT App. 53,298 P.3d 666 .............................................................passim
Richards v. Brown,
2012 UT 14, 123, 274 P.3d 911. .................................................................. 22
State v. Harker,
2010 UT 56, 1 12, 240 P.3d 780 ................................................................... 22
Timm v. Dewsnip,
2003 UT 47, 86 P.3d 699 ..................................................................... 17, 20
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Chalmers,
2 Utah 542 (1880) ............................................................................Passim
University Savings Association v. Springwood Shopping Center,
644 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Tex. 1982) ................................................................. 27
Washington Nat. Ins. Co v. Sherwood Associates,
795 P.2d 665,669 (Utah Ct. App 1990) ......................................................... 14
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.,
818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah Ct.App.1991) ....................................................... 27

STATUTES
Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-19 .............................................................. 2, 5, 12, 23
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21 ....................................................................passim
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-22 ......................................................................4, 22
Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-23 ....................................................................passim
Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-23.5 ........................................................... 5, 22, 24, 25
Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-28 .................................................................. 5, 28, 29

V

G0

Utah Code Ann.§ 78-A-4-103(2)O) ................................................................ 1
~

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-802.5 ............................................................ 2, 8, 10

OTHER AUTHORITIES
~

5 Tiffany REAL PROP.§ 1550 (3d ed.) ............................................................ 29
59 C.J.S Mortgages§ 739
(WestlawNext Database updated June 2014) .................................................... 15
2001 Utah Laws ch. 236 §2 ........................................................................ 24
2002 Utah Laws ch. 209 § 1........................................................................ 24
2004 Utah Laws ch. 177 § 1........................................................................ 24
Grant S. Nelson, Dale A. Whitman et al,
REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW§ 7:21 at 953-57 (6th ed. 2014) ................................ 21

Vl

JURISDICTION

This is an appeal from a final order of dismissal entered by Utah's Fifth Judicial
District Court, Washington County, St. George Department. This Court has Appellate
Jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 3(a) and Utah Code Ann.§
78-A-4-103(2)0). This Court transferred this case to the Court of Appeals. The parties
briefed and argued the case, but prior to the Court of Appeals issuing a decision, on
November 20, 2015, this Court recalled the case.
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED

Appellees Samuel and Courtney Adamsons' (the "Adamsons") Issue Presented:
Did the District Court interpret correctly Utah Code Ann. §§
57-1-21 and 23 to mean that when a trustee that is statutorily lacking
the power of sale under §§ 57-1-21 and 23 moves forward and
conducts a Foreclosure Sale in violation of the statute and issues a
Trustee's Deed that the Foreclosure Sale and Trustee's Deed are null
and void ab initio.
Appellant Bank of America N .A. ("BANA") presents an issue that is claiming that
the Utah Supreme Court made a flawed ruling 1 and is asking this Court to revisit its prior
well written rulings and change them. BANA offers no reason or justification for asking
~

this Court to set aside its prior rulings and nullify State statute. This Court has already
ruled that ReconTrust Company, N.A. ("ReconTrust") is not a statutorily qualified trustee
with the power of sale. Fannie Mae v. Sundquist 2013 UT 45, 311 P.3d 1004, cert
denied, ("ReconTrust is neither a member of the Utah State Bar nor a title insurance
company or agency with an office in the State of Utah. ReconTrust was not a qualified
1

Footnote I ofBANA's Original Opening Brief states: "Contrary to the flawed holding in Sundquist ... " See
Appellant's Original Opening Briefp5. fu. I.

1

trustee with the power of sale under Utah Code Sections 57-1-21 and 57-1-23.") BANA
makes statements of issue that assume facts not proven or even considered by the District
Court. This Court has already settled the issue that ReconTrust is not a qualified trustee
with the power of sale (Id) and therefore this court cannot respond to BANA's issues
presented because of the doctrine of issue preclusion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Fox v. Brigham
Young Univ., Inc., 2007 UT App 406114, 176 P.3d 446.

This Court reviews a District Court's interpretation of a statute for correctness.
McQueen v. Jordan Pines Townhomes Owners Ass'n, Inc., 2013 UT App. 53,298 P.3d

666.
DETERMINATIVE UTAH STATUTES
78B-6-802.5. Unlawful detainer after foreclosure or forced sale.
A previous owner, trustor, or mortgagor of a property is guilty of unlawful
detainer if the person:
(I)

defaulted on his or her obligations resulting in disposition of the property by a

trustee's sale or sherift's sale; and
(2)

continues to occupy the property after the trustee's sale or sheriffs sale after being

served with a notice to quit by the purchaser.
Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-19. Trust deeds -- Definitions of terms.
As used in Sections 57-1-20 through 57-1-36:
( 1)

"Beneficiary" means the person named or otherwise designated in a trust deed as
2

the person for whose benefit a trust deed is given, or his successor in interest.
(2)

"Trustor" means the person conveying real property by a trust deed as security for

the performance of an obligation.
(3)

"Trust deed" means a deed executed in conformity with Sections 57-1-20 through

57-1-36 and conveying real property to a trustee in trust to secure the performance of an
obligation of the trustor or other person named in the deed to a beneficiary.
(4)

"Trustee" means a person to whom title to real property is conveyed by trust deed,

or his successor in interest.
~

Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-21. Trustees of trust deeds -- Qualifications.
( 1)(a) The trustee of a trust deed shall be:
(i)

any active member of the Utah State Bar who maintains a place within the state

where the trustor or other interested parties may meet with the trustee to: (A) request
information about what is required to reinstate or payoff the obligation secured by the
trust deed; (B) deliver written communications to the lender as required by both the trust
deed and by law; (C) deliver funds to reinstate or pay off the loan secured by the trust
deed; or (D) deliver funds by a bidder at a foreclosure sale to pay for the purchase of the
property secured by the trust deed;

***
(iv)

any title insurance company or agency that: (A) holds a certificate of authority or

license under Title 3 lA, Insurance Code, to conduct insurance business in the state; (B) is
actually doing business in the state; and (C) maintains a bona fide office in the state;

***
3

(b)

For purposes of this Subsection (1), a person maintains a bona fide office within

the state if that person maintains a physical office in the state:
(i)

that is open to the public;

(ii)

that is staffed during regular business hours on regular business days; and

(iii)

at which a trustor of a trust deed may in person: (A) request information regarding

a trust deed; or (B) deliver funds, including reinstatement or payoff funds.

***
(2)

The trustee of a trust deed may not be the beneficiary of the trust deed, unless the

beneficiary is qualified to be a trustee under Subsection (l)(a)(ii), (iii), (v), or (vi).
(3)

The power of sale conferred by Section 57-1-23 may only be exercised by the

trustee of a trust deed if the trustee is qualified under Subsection (l)(a)(i) or (iv).
(4)

A trust deed with an unqualified trustee or without a trustee shall be effective to

create a lien on the trust property, but the power of sale and other trustee powers under
the trust deed may be exercised only if the beneficiary has appointed a qualified
successor trustee under Section 57-1-22.

Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-23. Sale of trust property -- Power of trustee -- Foreclosure
of trust deed.
The trustee who is qualified under Subsection 57-1-21(1)(a)(i) or (iv) is given the
power of sale by which the trustee may exercise and cause the trust property to be sold in
the manner provided in Sections 57-1-24 and 57-1-27, after a breach of an obligation for
which the trust property is conveyed as security; or, at the option of the beneficiary, a
trust deed may be foreclosed in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of

4

mortgages on real property. The power of sale may be exercised by the trustee without
express provision for it in the trust deed.
Utah Code Ann§ 57-1-23.5. Civil liability for unauthorized person who exercises
power of sale.
Go

( 1)

As used in this section:

(a)

"Unauthorized person" means a person who does not qualify as a trustee under

Subsection 57-1-2l{l)(a)(i) or (iv).
(b)

"Unauthorized sale" means the exercise of a power of sale by an unauthorized

person.
(2)

(a)

An unauthorized person who conducts an unauthorized sale is liable to the

trustor for the actual damages suffered by the trustor as a result of the unauthorized sale
or $2,000, whichever is greater.
(b)

In an action under Subsection (2)(a), the court shall award a prevailing plaintiff the

plaintiffs costs and attorney fees.
Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-28. Sale of trust property by trustee --Payment of bid -Trustee's deed delivered to purchaser -- Recitals - Effect (57-1-28(2) (b), (c))

***
(b)

The trustee's deed may contain recitals of compliance with the requirements of

Sections 57-1-19 through 57-1-36 relating to the exercise of the power of sale and sale of
~

the property described in the trustee's deed, including recitals concerning: (i) any mailing,
personal delivery, and publication of the notice of default; (ii) any mailing and the
publication and posting of the notice of sale; and (iii) the conduct of sale.
(c)

The recitals described in Subsection (2)(b ): (i) constitute prima facie evidence of

5

compliance with Sections 57-1-19 through 57-1-36; and (ii) are conclusive evidence in
favor of bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers for value and without notice.

***
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final order issued September 2, 2014, dismissing an
unlawful detainer action filed by Plaintiff Distressed Asset Solutions Fund I, LLC,
("Distressed Asset") against Samuel D. and Courtney D. Adamson. R. 434-5. BANA,
however, seeks to persuade this Court to overturn previous well written decisions handed
down by this Court, and attempts to introduce new material, all of which is irrelevant and
none of which was presented in their case in chief to the District Court. The material
BANA seeks to introduce to this Court in their Replacement Brief is in no way binding
and cannot even be considered persuasive, as it is in direct contravention to the holdings
of this Court and the Utah Statutes. It appears that BANA is also seeking to introduce the
material to preserve its positions for future appeals. Although the Adamsons do not seek
to introduce material that was not part of their case in chief, the A damsons preserve their
right to do so in the event of a future appeal.
On April 5, 2010, ReconTrust recorded in the Washington County Recorder's
Office a void Trustee's Deed purporting to have sold the Adamsons' property at
foreclosure sale on January 14, 2010. R. 8, Exhibit "A" to Complaint: ReconTrust
Trustee's Deed; Add. at 7. On January 5, 2014 Distressed Asset recorded in the
Washington County Recorder's Office a Quitclaim Deed that attempted to convey the
Adamsons' property from BANA to Distressed Asset. R. 10-13, Exhibit B to Complaint;
6

Add. at 10. On February 7, 2014, Distressed Asset, who is not a bona fide purchaser of
the property, filed an unlawful detainer action against the Adamsons. R. 1-22,
Complaint; Add. at 1-21.
During the Adamsons' case-in-chief, Mr. Samuel Adamson testified that he was in
constant contact with BANA from December 2008 through April of 2010. R. 450, Trial
Tr. 26:17-27:2, 27:21-29:15; Add. at 41-57. Mr. Adamson testified that even after the
illegal foreclosure BANA continued to negotiate for a modification. R. 450, Trial Tr.
30:6-13; Add. at 48. The Adamsons presented evidence that they were prejudiced by the
1-i)

fact that ReconTrust illegally foreclosed on their home. Mr. Adamson testified that he
was attempting to negotiate a work-out with BANA so that they could become current on
their mortgage when ReconTrust conducted an illegal foreclosure sale without the
statutory power of sale. Id.
On September 2, 2014 the District Court dismissed the unlawful detainer case.

~

The Court found that according to McQueen v. Jordan Pines Townhomes Owners Ass 'n,
Inc., 2013 UT App. 53, 298 P.3d 666, the "sale was void based only on the fact that the

person who conducted it had not been appointed as a trustee as statutorily required." R.
409; App. at 29. The District Court also found that Distressed Asset is not a bona fide
purchaser of the Adamsons' property. The District Court stated that under Singer Mfg.
Co. v. Chalmers, 2 Utah 542 ( 1880) the status of a Bona Fide Purchaser "cannot validate

a void sale." App. at 37; R. 417. The District Court concluded by holding that
Distressed Asset did not meet their burden of proof of a showing that the Trustee's Sale
was conducted in accordance with the Utah statutes, and that "Plaintiff has not overcome
7

Defendants' defense that there has been no disposition of the property by a trustee's
sale," as required under Utah Code§ 78B-6-802.5[.]" App. at 39; R 419.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Adamsons purchased their dream home in 2003 on a 30 year fixed mortgage.
R. 450, Trial Tr. 24:15, 24-25. In 2007 the Adamsons refinanced their home on a 30 year
fixed mortgage with Guild Mortgage who in turn sold the loan to Country Wide Home
Loan Servicing LP who in turn sold the loan to BANA. R. 450, Trial Tr. 25:2-25; Add.
at 42-44. In year 2008 Mr. Adamson's landscape business declined due to the economy.
Approaching winter, Mr. Adamson's work truck transmission went out and he had to
spend his accumulated savings on the repairs. Before Mr. Adamson had missed a
mortgage payment he contacted Bank of America to inform them of the hardship he was
facing. Mr. Adamson was unable to pay the December 2008 mortgage payment. R. 450,
Trial Tr. 26: 13-21; Add. at 44.
Mr. Adamson attempted several times to obtain a loan modification. In the spring
of2009 Mr. Adamson's work had picked back up and he had the means to make the
monthly payments, but, according to Mr. Adamson, BANA would not accept his
payments. In the fall of 2009, Mr. Adamson hired Fortified Financial to assist him in his
efforts to obtain a loan modification. Because ReconTrust nor bank of America has an
office in the State of Utah, Mr. Adamson paid Fortified Financial the sum of $3700.00 to
make contact with Bank of America and assist the Adamsons with negotiations for a loan
modification. R. 450 Trial Tr. 27:21-28:25; Add. at 45-46.
In about January 2010 the property was illegally foreclosed upon by ReconTrust
8

acting as Trustee of the Deed of Trust. R. 8, Exhibit "A" to Complaint: ReconTrust
Trustee's Deed; Add. at 7. The property was sold to BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP
FKA CountyWide Home Loans Servicing LP, as Grantee. Id, Void ReconTrust Trustee's
Deed.
Prior to the foreclosure and up through April of 2010 the Adamsons kept in
contact with Bank of America and ReconTrust as they were attempting to obtain a home
loan modification. Add. at 47-48; R. 450, Trial Tr. 29:1-30:17. At one point Mr.
Adamson was told that his payments would not be accepted and that he should not make
any payments. Add. at 56; R 450, Trial Tr. 38:11-22.
On or about April 5, 2010 BANA attempted eviction proceedings through an
unlawful detainer action. Add. at 3,r 12; R. 5 ,r12. The District Court dismissed the
Unlawful Detainer Action. Add. at 4 ,r 21; R. 6 ,r21. That is not the issue of this appeal.
Four years later BANA issued a Quitclaim Deed to Distressed Asset, who
~

attempted eviction proceedings through an Unlawful Detainer Action. Add. at 1-21; R.
1-22, Complaint. Judge Jeffrey Wilcox of the Fifth District Court ruled that eviction
could not go forward because the Plaintiff, Distressed Asset, had not met the required
elements of proof of a valid sale. Add. at 22-39; R. 402-420, Decision and Order
Dismissing Action for Unlawful Detainer.
Because of the illegal foreclosure sale and issuance of a void Trustee's Deed by
ReconTrust, the Adamsons claim that their rights were affected, their interests were
sacrificed, and that there was unfair dealing by BANA and ReconTrust. Add. at 45-48;
R. 450, Trial Tr. 27:21-30:17, R. 5 ,Il2, R. 6 ,r21, R. 1-22, R. 402-419. Adamsons take
9

issue with the fact the lender did not appoint a qualified trustee with the statutory power
of sale and that an unqualified trustee sold the real property and that the lender is
claiming that the Trustee's Deed is valid and voidable rather than null and void ab initio.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Adamsons agree that the District Court correctly dismissed the unlawful
detainer action against them because Distressed Asset was unable to show fulfillment of
the first element: disposition of the property by a valid Trustee's Sale as required under
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-802.5. The Adamsons defended against the Unlawful Detainer
action arguing that the ReconTrust foreclosure sale and Trustee's Deed are null and void
an initio, and the Court agreed. Add. at 39; R. 419.
This Court cannot overturn the District Court's ruling. The District Court based
its ruling on Utah Supreme Court case precedents of Singer Mfg. Co. v. Chalmers, 2 Utah
542 (1880), Fannie Mae v. Sundquist, 2013 Utah 45,311 P.3d 1004, and McQueen v.
Jordan Pines Townhomes Owners Ass 'n Inc., 2013 UT App 53,298 P.3d 666. In Singer

the Utah Supreme Court held that a foreclosure sale performed by one not authorized to
do so is void. See Singer. Under McQueen, there are three elements required by the Trust
Deed Act for a proper disposition of real property through a trustee's sale: 1) a valid trust
relationship, 2) a statutorily authorized trustee, and 3) the adherence to correct procedural
requirements. McQueen at 670 1 11. A violation of the first two elements would render
a foreclosure sale and trustee's deed null and void out of operation of law. If the Court
finds a violation of the third element then the court tests the amount of harm incurred by
the trustor to determine if the foreclosure sale and Trustee's deed is voidable.
10

ReconTrust does not have the power of sale granted under UCA 57-1-21

(Sundquist), which is a fatal flaw under the second element of the Trust Deed Act (See
McQueen ), and therefore renders the foreclosure sale and trustee's deed null and void ab
initio (See Singer).
The Adamsons suffered prejudice as a result of the foreclosure sale by
ReconTrust. The Adamsons were in the process of obtaining a loan modification and
bringing their mortgage current when they were foreclosed upon by ReconTrust who did
not have the power of sale as given under Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-21(3) (See Sundquist).
~

R. 450 27 :21-30: 17. ReconTrust is in violation of the statute which was crafted and
amended to protect the rights of all parties involved (Kleinsmith v. Shurtleff, 571 F .3d
1033 (10 th Cir. 2009)).
Distressed Asset is not a bona fide purchaser. BANA cannot overcome the fatal
flaw that ReconTrust did not have the power of sale as required by a qualified trustee.

~

And therefore, under Singer, and McQueen, an unqualified trustee cannot conduct a valid
trustee's sale and no property passes to the buyer.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE UTAH STATE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN THEY
INTERPRETED THE TRUST DEED ACT AND RULE THAT THE FORECLOSURE
SALE AND TRUSTEE'S DEED Is VOID AB INITIO.

Adamsons agree that the district court issued a correct opinion when it declared
the Foreclosure Sale conducted by ReconTrust and Trustee's Deed issued by ReconTrust
null and void ab initio and dismissed the unlawful detainer action. Recon Trust does not
have the power of sale to enable it to conduct a valid foreclosure sale (Sundquist (In four
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cases, however, the federal district courts have reached the contrary result and held that
Utah law is not preempted. Cox v. ReconTrust Co., NA., 2011 WL 835893, at 6 (D. Utah
2011) (stating that "[u}nder a straightforward reading of[section] 92a(b), this court
must look to Utah law in its analysis ofwhether ReconTrust's activities in Utah exceed
ReconTrust's trustee powers"); Coleman v. ReconTrust Co., N.A., US. Dist. LEXIS
138519 (D. Utah 2011) (agreeing with the reasoning applied in Cox); Loomis v. Meridias
Capital, Inc., 2011 WL 5844304 (D. Utah 2011) (same); Bell v. Countrywide Bank, N.A.,
860 F.Supp.2d 1290 (D. Utah 2012) (same). We find Judge Jenkins' analysis in Bell to be
particularly persuasive, and follow much ofthis same analysis here. Like Judge Jenkins,
we conclude that ReconTrust is subject to the laws of Utah when exercising the power to
sell property located in Utah.), therefore cannot issue a trustees deed other than a void

trustee's deed (Singer and McQueen).
A. The Trust Deed Act Is Interpreted As Requiring Three Elements
Before A Proper Foreclosure Sale Can Be Held And Valid Trustee's
Deed Issued.
Adamsons argue that in McQueen the Court held that the trust deed act dictates the
necessity of three elements to effectuate a valid foreclosure sale: 1) creation of a trust
relationship; 2) a qualified trustee; and 3) the adherence to correct procedural
requirements. McQueen at 670 , 11, holding that "The Trust Deed Act, in addition to
other procedural requirements like proper notice, requires the creation of a trust
relationship and the appointment of a qualified trustee."

I. The Creation OfA Trust Relationship.
The language of the Utah Trust Deed Act is clear. Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-19
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defines the parties necessary to the creation of the trust relationship, and subsection (3)
defines the relevant statutory parameters of the Trust Deed Act. A fatal flaw results
without the formation of a trust relationship between parties, and there would be no
further inquiry necessary. See McQueen. The Adamsons do not contend that there was
not a valid trust relationship between the parties.

2. A Qualified Trustee.
After the creation of the trust deed relationship, McQueen states that one must
look to the qualifications of the Trustee, and an unqualified trustee possesses a fatal flaw.
The controlling statutes that determine the qualification of the trustee are Utah Code Ann.

§§ 57-1-21, and 23. After analysis of the statutes, the Sundquist court decided that
ReconTrust is not a qualified Trustee under§§ 57-1-21, and 23. Sundquist at 49.
Section 57-1-21 prescribes the qualifications of the trustee under the trust deed act.
Section 57-1-23 is a reiteration of 57-1-21(3), and gives further clarification of how the
power of sale is to be carried out.
The importance and significance of the appointment of a qualified trustee is
described as follows "The purpose of requiring the appointment of a qualified trustee is to
provide an independent third party who can objectively execute a foreclosure or sale in
the absence of judicial oversight. See generally Russell v. Lundberg, 2005 UT App 315, ,
22, 120 P.3d 541 ("[A] trustee has a duty to act with reasonable diligence and good faith
on [the trustor's] behalf consistent with [the trustee's] primary obligation to assure
payment of the secured debt." (alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)). Indeed, while a trustee's obligations in a trust deed relationship do not
13

normally rise to the level of fiduciary duty, a trustee is not without any duty whatsoever.
See id. ("While a trustee's primary duty and obligation is to the beneficiary of the trust,
the trustee's duty to the beneficiary does not imply that the trustee may ignore the trustor's
rights and interests." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Blodgett v.
Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1978) ("The duty of the trustee under a trust deed is
greater than the mere obligation to sell the pledged property in accordance with the
default provision of the trust deed instrument, it is a duty to treat the trustor fairly and in
accordance with a high punctilio of honor."). "This underlying rationale behind the
trustee requirement thus strengthens our conclusion that a party must appoint a qualified
trustee in order to enforce an assessment lien without judicial intervention." McQueen at
673. The appointed trustee, ReconTrust, ignored the Adamsons' rights and interest as
trustors, and that the Adamsons were not treated fairly as required under case law as sited
above.
In his decision to dismiss the unlawful detainer action, Judge Wilcox of the Fifth
District Court stated "Plaintift's arguments are unpersuasive. First, the provisions in
Utah Code section 57-1-21 and 57-1-23 restricting who is authorized to conduct a
trustee's sale are clearly comparable to the trust deed provisions identifying who was

authorized to conduct a trustee's sale in Singer, particularly since 'a contract,' such as the
trust deed here, 'implicitly contains the laws existing at the time it was entered.'
Washington Nat. Ins. Co v. Sherwood Associates, 795 P.2d 665,669 (Utah Ct. App 1990)
(citing, among other cases, Beehive Med. Elecs., Inc. v. Indus. Comm 'n, 583 P.2d 53, 60
(Utah 1978) (citing Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595 601, 24 L.Ed 793 (1878), holding
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that contracts embrace laws which affect their validity, construction, discharge, and
enforcement))); 59 C.J.S Mortgages§ 739 (WestlawNext Database updated June 2014)
(The power to sell under deed of trust is [a] matter of contract between the mortgagor and
mortgagee under the terms and conditions expressed in [the] deed of trust instrument. It
cannot be enlarged beyond the terms of the contract and the incorporated relevant
statutes.)" (emphasis omitted). Add. at 27-28; R. 407-8, Decision and Order page 6-7.
The District Court followed statutory law and case precedent holding that an
unqualified trustee renders the foreclosure sale and trustees deed null and void ab initio
and made factual findings that ReconTrust did not have the power of sale necessary to
effectuate a real property sale in Utah and therefore the Foreclosure Sale on the
Adamsons' home and the ReconTrust Trustee's Deed is null and void ab initio.
Case law fortifies the District Courts interpretation of the Utah statutes. In

Sundquist the Utah Supreme Court held "In four cases, [ ] the federal district courts have
(.iib

reached the contrary result and held that Utah law is not preempted. Bell v. Countrywide

Bank, N.A., 860 F.Supp.2d 1290 (D. Utah 2012) (holding that a national bank is subject
to Utah law); Loomis v. Meridias Capital, Inc., No. 2: l 1-cv-363-PMW, 2011 WL
5844304 (D. Utah Nov. 18, 2011) (same); Coleman v. ReconTrust Co., N.A., No. 2:10cv-1099-DB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138519 (D. Utah Oct. 4, 2011) (same); Cox v.

ReconTrust Co., NA., No. 2:10-CV-492 CW, 2011 WL 835893, at 6 (D. Utah Mar. 3,
2011) (stating that" [u]nder a straight forward reading of§ 92a(b), this court must look to
Utah law in its analysis of whether ReconTrust's activities in Utah exceed ReconTrust's
trustee powers"). We find Judge Jenkins's analysis in Bell to be particularly persuasive,
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and follow much of this same analysis here. Like Judge Jenkins, we conclude that
ReconTrust is subject to the laws of Utah when exercising the power to sell property
located in Utah."
The McQueen Court did not enter into an analysis of the obstacles to setting aside
a trustees sale that were mentioned, and indeed dispositive, in the RM Lifestyles ( RM
Lifestyles, LLC v. Ellison 2011 UT App 290, 263 P.2d 1152) and Reynolds (Reynolds v.
Woodall, 2012 UT App 206,285 P.3d 7) cases, rather the court simply addressed the
claimed defect - the absence of the statutorily required qualified appointed trustee - on
its merits, and agreed that it rendered the sale void. Judge Wilcox made the same
determination as the McQueen court, that is, no analysis is required to determine whether
or not the sale and Trustee's Deed is voidable because the Sale and Trustee's Deed are
void out of operation of statutory law.
Therefore, a court faced with an unqualified trustee need not progress to an
analysis of the obstacles to setting aside a trustee's sale, since, under operation of
statutory law, there never was a foreclosure sale because there never was an authorized
trustee.
3. A Valid Trustee Must Adhere To Correct Procedural
Requirements As Stated Under The Code.
After determining that because ReconTrust did not have the power of sale and that
the Foreclosure Sale and Trustee's Deed was null and void ab initio, the District Court
did not move onto the next analysis and look for errors in procedure. The District Court
was correct in not moving into an analysis for setting aside the sale because in order to
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set aside the sale, the first two requisites of the Trust Deed Act must have been fulfilled
(which in this case they were not), and the court correctly pointed out that the sale was
void. Id; See Sundquist, McQueen, and Singer.
Adamsons agree with the District Court that because there was no foreclosure sale
on their home, that no inquiry into the procedural requirements should be entertained.
However, for purposes of this brief, Adamsons will enter into an analysis of the cases
under the third element of the Trust Deed Act so that the Court can see how a proper
analysis should take place and that the cases do not apply to the Adamsons' case.
After finding that the first two elements of the Trust Deed Act are fulfilled then
the courts start the analysis to determine if the valid trustee's sale is voidable and that is
when the burden of proof shifts to the property owner. See RM Lifestyles (requiring a
showing of fraud or unfair dealing); Reynolds (requiring a showing of fraud or unfair
dealing); and Timm v. Dewsnip, 2003 UT 47, 86 P.3d 699 (A party who Seeks to have a
~

trustee sale set aside for irregularity, want of notice, or fraud has the burden of proving
his contention[.]).
Adamsons argue that at no time before this point in the analysis are the following
cases activated, and prior to entering into the analysis to determine if the Foreclosure sale
is voidable the burden of proof that the statutory requirements are met is on the shoulders
of the entity invoking the power of sale. "[T]he presumption of validity of sale is not
conclusive and may be rebutted." Concepts Inc., v First Sec Realty Serv. Inc., 843 P.2d
1158 (Utah 1987) (per curiam), quoting Houston First American Savings v. Musick, 650
S.W.2d 764 {Tex. 1983).
17

Under the third element of the Trust Deed Act, the factors the court generally
looks to in determining if the foreclosure sale is voidable are '"if the interests of the
debtor were sacrificed or there was some attendant fraud or unfair dealing."' RM
Lifestyles if 16 (quoting Concepts).
In RM Lifestyles the home owner did not claim that the foreclosure sale was void
due to lack of power of sale, but rather claimed that the sale was voidable because the
Notice of Default was improperly recorded. The Court did not find that the trustee had
violated the first two prongs of the Trust Deed Act. 2 The issue in RM Lifestyles is
distinguishable from the issue presented by the Adamsons. In RM Lifestyles the property
owner asked the court to determine if the lack of adherence to the statute requiring a
properly recorded Notice of Default rendered the foreclosure sale voidable, and in this
case the Adamsons are claiming that a fatal flaw in trustee rendered the sale and resulting
trustee's deed null and void ab initio. See RM Lifestyles.
In Reynolds, the home owner, Reynolds, did not claim that the power of sale had
been violated. Reynolds asserted that the trustee's sale is void because Woodall recorded
the notice of default and held the trustee's sale before Citibank executed and recorded a
written substitution of trustee. Reynolds further argues that because there was no written
substitution of trustee when Woodall carried out the nonjudicial foreclosure, the
subsequent attempt at ratification violates the statute of frauds. The court found that
Reynolds arguments need not be addressed and held that Reynolds has not alleged that

2

eTitle Insurance Agency is a valid title insurance company in the State of Utah with a with a brick and mortar
location in Utah.
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the challenged substitution of trustee impacted her rights. Again, the issue in Reynolds is
distinguishable from the present case in that Reynolds did not allege that Woodall did not
have authority to conduct a foreclosure sale on the property, whereas the Adamsons have
alleged that their rights were impacted by the fact that ReconTrust is not a valid trustee
with the power of sale. Reynolds is further distinguishable in that the Trustee, James
Woodall 3, who conducted the Reynolds foreclosure sale is a valid trustee in the State of
Utah with the power of sale and the lender was able to ratify Woodall' s actions by filing
a substitution of trustee, whereas ReconTrust is not a valid trustee with the power of sale
and there is no document that the lender could file that would ratify the void foreclosure
sale and void trustee's deed.
Reynolds is also distinguishable from McQueen. In McQueen, the Court held that
the trustee did not have the power of sale because he never received proper appointment,
and that the condominium act fell under the Trust Deed Act for the requirements to
conduct a foreclosure sale. In McQueen the condominium association did not ratify their
actions by latter appointing the foreclosing attorney as trustee. In Reynolds, the lender
appointed the foreclosing attorney as trustee after the foreclosure sale.
In Blodgett the Court refused to set aside a trustee's sale because of irregularities
in the posting of the Notice of Sale. See Blodgett, ("Such a sale cannot be set aside
because of irregularities in the publication or posting of notice.") The Adamsons case is
not like the Blodgett case. The Adamsons are not claiming irregularities in publication or
posting of sale, but rather claim that the sale itself was void.
3

James Woodall is a Utah licensed attorney with a brick and mortar office in Utah.
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In Timm the court stated "the remedy of setting aside a trustee's sale is appropriate
only in cases which reach unjust extremes." Id at ,36. Timm accurately describes the
prevailing case law in Utah when the first two elements of the Trust Deed Act articulated
under McQueen have been met. In Timm, the fact that the trustee was validly appointed
and validly exercised the power of sale is a fact that distinguishes that case and places it
under the analysis of element three of the Trust Deed Act. In Timm the property owner
claimed that the sale was defective and voidable because of defective notice of sale. At
no time did the property owner raise the issue of the lack of the power of sale in the
trustee.
In Concepts the property owner claimed that a mistake in the publication of notice
of sale prevented the trustee from invoking the power of sale. Again, Concepts falls into
the third element of the Trust Deed Act because the property owner is claiming that there
was a flaw in the procedure and not that the statutes prevented the trustee from exercising
the power of sale.
The line of cases that move through an analysis of the obstacles to setting aside a
foreclosure sale and a Trustee's Deed are distinguishable from the Adamson case.
Adamson falls under the Singer, McQueen, Sundquist line of case which deal with the
fatal flawed trustees that do not have to power of sale, whereas RM Lifestyles, Reynolds,
Timm, and Concepts all deal with irregularities in the conduct of the trustee, but do not

deny that the trustee has the power of sale.
i.

The Adamsons Have Suffered Great Harm And Preiudice At The
Hands Of BANA And ReconTrust.
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Although the Adamsons agree that the District Court correctly held that the
~

Trustee' Foreclosure Sale and Trustee's Deed is null and void ab initio, and that the
District Court did not need to enter into a test to determine the extent the Adamsons have
been harmed, for purposes of this brief the Adamsons state their harm.
Mr. Adamson testified in court that he and his wife were attempting to negotiate
with the lender to allow them to come current on their mortgage when ReconTrust
foreclosed on their property. Mr. Adamson testified that he paid a substantial amount of
money to a company to assist him in his negotiations with BANA because BANA refused

~

to accept any payments from him. Mr. and Mrs. Adamson further suffered at the hands
of BANA when they attempted to evict the Adamsons in 2010 and failed, then attempted
to convey the Adamson property to Distressed Asset who again attempted to evict the
A damsons.
B. The Result Of A Proper Analysis Of The Trust Deed Act Requires A
Finding That The ReconTrust Foreclosure Sale and Trustee's Deed
Is Null And Void Ab Initio.
Adamsons argue that there are three possible outcomes when litigating a trustee's
deed: 1) the Trustee's Deed is void, 2) the Trustee's Deed is voidable, and 3) the
Trustee's Deed is valid. A finding by the District Court that either of the first two
elements of the Trust Deed Act have been violated requires a ruling that the Foreclosure

~

Sale and resulting Trustee's Deed is null and void ab initio. Singer and McQueen; Grant
S. Nelson, Dale A. Whitman et al, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW§ 7:21 at 953-57 {6th ed.
2014). Lacking either of the first two elements would render the foreclosure sale and the
resulting Trustee's deed null and void ab inito. Singer at 547 ("The fact that no injury or
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fraud in the sale has been shown, does not affect the question. Nor is it affected by the
fact, that the purchaser was an innocent party. The sale was made by one not authorized
to make it, and cannot be upheld. It is simply void, and no one gains any rights under
it.").
A determination that the first two elements are met, that there is a valid trust
relationship and a statutorily authorized trustee would then move the court into a fact
finding that may render the foreclosure sale and resulting trustee's deed voidable. As the
Court stated in McQueen "'We employ plain language analysis to carry out the legislative
purpose of the statute as expressed through the enacted text.' Richards v. Brown, 2012
UT 14,123, 274 P.3d 911 (footnote citations omitted). Based on this basic rule of
statutory construction, we agree with the district court's application of the Trust Deed Act
to a nonjudicial foreclosure of an assessment lien and its determination that the
appointment of a qualified trustee with the power of sale is necessary to conduct a
nonjudicial foreclosure or sale[.]" McQueen, p. 672-3 ,IlS. ''The District Court correctly
construed [ ] the Trust Deed Act to require the appointment of a qualified trustee with the
power of sale. Because the Association failed to comply with this requirement, we affirm
the district court's summary judgment ruling that the nonjudicial foreclosure sale was
ineffective and void." McQueen, p 675 ,I 28.
When interpreting a statute, our goal II is to give effect to the legislature's intent. 11

State v. Harker, 2010 UT 56,112,240 P.3d 780 (internal quotation marks omitted). "To
discern legislative intent, we look first to the statute's plain language. Also, when
interpreting statutes, [w ]e presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and read
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each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning. Additionally, [w]e read the
~

plain language of [a] statute as a whole and interpret its provisions in harmony with other
statutes in the same chapter and related chapters. Furthermore, if the plain meaning of the
statute can be discerned from its language, no other interpretive tools are needed." Id.
(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted). Courts "should
avoid adding to or deleting from statutory language, unless absolutely necessary to make
it a rational statute." Lorenzo v. Workforce Appeals Bd., 2002 UT App 371, tJ 11, 58 P.3d
873.
Singer, McQueen, and Sundquist require that the ReconTrust Trustee's Deed is
void ab initio. BANA asks the Court to make a determination that the ReconTrust
Trustee's deed is voidable. But, such a ruling would be contrary to established law.
Reviewing the history behind the amendments that refined the power of sale is
enlightening. The most recent amendments to§ 57-1-21 are discussed in the Kleinsmith
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case. The case deals with an out of State trustee challenging the Utah foreclosure
statutes, just as BANA is doing here. As the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals worked
through§ 57-1-21, the Court stated:
"A trust deed conveys real property in trust to secure a debt; the debtor,
who typically has used the loan proceeds to purchase a home, is also the
trustor. See §57-1-19. In the event of default, the trustee may conduct a
nonjudicial sale of the property or institute foreclosure proceedings. See
§57-1-23. According to Mr. Kleinsmith's complaint, as a trustee he could
"prepare trustee foreclosure sale documents, supervise their recording,
service, mailing and posting and supervise a crier to conduct foreclosure
sales, all without personally being present in the state of Utah."
The initial amendment that harmed his business became effective in April
2001. It required licensed Utah attorneys to reside in the state in order to
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qualify as trustees. See 2001 Utah Laws ch. 236 §2. Mr. Kleinsmith
successfully challenged the constitutionality of the residency requirement
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the
Constitution. See Kleinsmith v. Shurtleff, No. 2:01cv0310 ST, slip op. at 15
(D.Utah Aug. 13, 2001).
The legislature then amended the statute effective May 6, 2002, to require
that attorney trustees either reside in Utah or "maintain[] a bona fide office
in the state." 2002 Utah Laws ch. 209 § 1. The amendment defined a bona
fide office as a physical office open to the public and staffed during regular
business hours, at which a trustor could request infonnation and deliver
funds in person.
Mr. Kleinsmith again challenged the statute's
constitutionality and again prevailed, this time on the ground that it violated
the federal Constitution's dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating
against out-of-state economic interests. See Kleinsmith v. Shurtleff, No.
2:03-CV-63TC, slip op. at 1-2 (D.Utah July 3, 2003). In response, the Utah
legislature amended the statute a third time. See 2004 Utah Laws ch. 177
§ 1. As to the current foreclosure statute the court held: "Making it easier
for Utahns to meet with trustees, who play a pivotal role in nonjudicial
foreclosures, is a legitimate state interest. And Utah's legislature could
rationally have concluded that this interest would be served by requiring
attorney-trustees to maintain a place within Utah for meeting with trustors
and other interested persons.

See Kleinsmith.
As subsection (2), and (3) of§ 57-1-21 make clear the power of sale is reserved
for those that do not have an interest in the real property. See UCA § 57-1-21(2), (3).
The legislature carved out a narrowly defined existence for the exercise of the power of
sale. This is significant-and illustrates the point that a violation of the power of sale has
severe consequences.
Upon examination of the Trust Deed Act and interpreting the Statute, Judge
Jeffrey Wilcox determined that the ReconTrust Foreclosure Sale and Trustee's Deed is
null and void ab initio. This is the correct determination according to statue and case law.
II.

THE LACK OF A STATUTORILY AUTHORIZED TRUSTEE WITH THE POWER
OF SALE RES ULTS IN NOTHING MORE THAN A LIEN ON THE PROPERTY.
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Without the appointment of a qualified trustee there can be nothing more than a
\@

lien on the real property. Subsection (4) of§ 57-1-21 dictates the limitations upon an
unqualified trustee such as Recon Trust, and states that at most a lien on the property is
created when there is present an unqualified trustee, such as ReconTrust.
A trust deed with an unqualified trustee or without a trustee shall be
effective to create a lien on the trust property, but the power of sale
and other trustee powers under the trust deed may be exercised only
if the beneficiary has appointed a qualified successor trustee under
Section 57-1-22.
See§ 57-1-21(4).

The District Court was correct when it stated that the foreclosure sale and Trustees
Deed is null and void ab initio.
A. Section 57-1-23.5 Authorizes The Court To Declare The Foreclosure
Sale And Trustees Deed Null And Void Ab Initio.
Section 57-1-23.5 defines "Unauthorized person" as a person who does not qualify
as a trustee under Section 57-1-2l(l)(a)(i) or (iv). See UCA § 57-1-23.5. Section 57-1~

23.5 then states under subsection (2)(a) ""An unauthorized person who conducts an
unauthorized sale is liable to the trustor for actual damages suffered by the trustor as a
result of the unauthorized sale or $2000.00, whichever is greater. Id.
Adamsons agree with the District Court in determining that the statute had no
retroactive effect and indeed a plane reading of the statute clearly shows that it is not
written to have such an effect. However, even if the statute were to be intended to be
retroactive the damage awarded would still render the trustee's sale and deed void as

~

UCA § 57-1-23.5 gives the Court authority to declare the ReconTrust Foreclosure Sale
and Trustee's Deed null and void ab initio
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BANA's reading of the statute is in conflict with the Subsection (4) of§ 57-1-21
which states the absence of an unauthorized trustee only operates to render a lien on the
property. The court's ruling that the Trustee's Deed is void is in harmony with both
statutes where§ 57-1-23.5(2)(a) gives actual damages and§ 57-1-21(4) gives a lien on
the property. By ruling that the Trustee's Deed is void ("actual damages"§ 57-123.5(2)(a)), BANA returns to the position of mortgage holder ("A trust deed with an
unqualified trustee or without a trustee shall be effective to create a lien on the trust
property[.]" § 57-1-21(4)).
III.

BANK OF AMERICA IS IGNORING THE FACT THAT RECONTRUST VIOLA TED
THE STATUTES AND Is ASKING THIS COURT To IGNORE STATUTE AND
CASE PRECEDENT.

Case precedent is well established and has consistently held that a Trustee without
the power of sale can sell nothing. In the 1880 Singer case, the Utah Supreme Court
recognized that no interest in real property could be passed if the foreclosure sale was
void. Quoting Singer, "The sale was made by one not authorized to make it, and cannot
be upheld. It is simply void, and no one gains any rights under it."See id. "As Judge
Jenkins stated in Bell v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., '[a] state bank which Seeks to foreclose
on real property in Utah must comply with Utah law. A federally chartered 'bank' which
Seeks to foreclose on such property must comply with Utah law as well."' Sundquist p 17

,r 51. See Also McQueen.
IV.

ADAMSONS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF WA IVER AND
ESTOPPEL BECAUSE THERE WAS NEVER AVAUD FORECLOSURE SALE OR
TRUSTEES DEED.

Adamsons have not nor can they waive their right to challenge the foreclosure
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sale. A party may not waive the right to challenge or be stopped from challenging a sale
wholly void. Am. Falls Canal Sec. Co. V. Am. Sav. & Loan As 'n, 775 P.2d 412,414
(Utah 1989).

V.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERROR IN ITS USE OF LEGAL AUTHORITY

As A MEANS To ILLUSTRATE THE FACT THAT THE TRUSTEES DEED Is
VOID.

BANA has presented no rule that disallows the District court from using legal
~

authority to illustrate a point. "The challenging party must marshal all relevant evidence
presented at trial which tends to support the findings and demonstrate why the findings
are clearly erroneous." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah
Ct.App.1991) (citations omitted). The District Court used the additional legal authority
to demonstrate that the trail court's ruling is not unique but is well established law.
VI.

BANA's ACTIONS ARE ADVERSE To THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

The State of Utah holds in high regard the power of sale within the Trust Deed
Gil)

Act. The reason for strict compliance with the statute "is to protect the property of the
debtor", See Concepts citing University Savings Association v. Springwood Shopping

Center, 644 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Tex. 1982). After performing a complete analysis of§ 571-21 the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Kleinsmith held that Utah law provides that the
''power of sale" for trustees of trust deeds conducting non-judicial foreclosures is limited
(@

to active members of the Utah State Bar and title insurance companies having a place of
business in the State. See§§ 57-1-21, 57-1-23. See Kleinsmith (upholding the narrow
power of sale codified as§§ 57-1-21, 57-1-23 as a "legitimate State interest").
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VII.

THIS COURT CANNOT ENTERTAIN THE ISSUE RAISED IN APPELLANT'S
BRIEF REGARDING THE NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE VOID TRUSTEES
DEED BECAUSE THE ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED IN THE DISTRICT COURT.

The Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction allowing it to entertain
the issues raised by BANA regarding the implications of the void trustee's deed on
current occupants because the issue was not raised or addressed in the District Court. See
§ 78A-4-103.

VIII. BANA CANNOT PREVAIL BECAUSE THEY ARE PRECLUDED FROM RELYING
UPON THE STATUTE ALLOWING THEM To FORECLOSE UPON THE REAL
PROPERTY AND OBTAIN A TRUSTEES DEED.
BANA is requesting this court to validate what they feel is their statutory relief
under the Trust Deed Act; however, the right to recover damages is statutory, it can only
be availed of when there has been a compliance with the conditions upon which the right
is conferred. See Hurley v. Town ofBingham, 63 Utah 589,228 P. 213. "Where a right is
purely statutory and is granted upon conditions, one who seeks to enforce the right must
by allegation and proof bring himself within the conditions." Johnson v. City of
Glendale, 12 Cal.App.2d 389, 55 P.2d 580. Quoting Hamilton v. Salt Lake City, 106

P.2d 1028, 99 Utah 362 (Utah 1940).
IX.

DISTRESSED ASSET Is NOT A BONA FIDE PURCHASER.

Judge Wilcox determined that protection afforded to BFP's by§ 57-1-28 is not
intended to extend, and does not extend, to protect against defects traditionally viewed as
fundamental, such as the one at issue here. Singer holds that such status cannot validate a
void sale. See Singer. McQueen holds the same, and does not validate a void sale
regardless of the status of the purchaser. See McQueen.
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Plaintiff BANA attempts to argue that RM Lifestyles holds that there is a
"presumption that a trustee's deed, which states that it complies with the statutory
requirements, is 'conclusive evidence in favor of bona fide purchasers' of the trustee's
deed's validity." See RM Lifestyles 117 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-28(2)(c)(ii)).
However, section 57-1-28 is not meant to be inclusive of fundamental defects such as a
trustee without the power of sale but conducting a foreclosure sale and issuing a trustee's
deed. In the District Court's decision, Judge Wilcox cites Main I Ltd. P 'ship v. Venture

Capital Const. & Dev. Corp., 154 Ariz. 256,260, 741 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Ariz. Ct. App.
<@

1987) ( observing, with reference to an Arizona conclusive presumption statute similar to
that of Utah, and without apparent disagreement, that ''[w ]hen the California cases hold
that recitals in a deed of trust are conclusive, they qualify that they are conclusive 'in the

~

absence of grounds for equitable relief,"' but finding equitable relief inappropriate in a
case where there was no fraud, misrepresentation, concealment," bad faith or breach of
~

fiduciary duty). Add. at 38; R. 418. Judge Wilcox then turns to 5 Tiffany REAL PROP.§
1550 (3d ed.), to illustrate the statutory intent. Tiffany states, "It appears that the sale
will ordinarily be set aside in equity on grounds on which it would have been previously
enjoined, as for instance where the debt never existed, or has been extinguished, or was
conducted by a party without authority to do so, or where the notice of sale was
substantially defective." R. 419.
X.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

No cases cited by BANA support a policy that is good for the public and does not
create confusion. No case cited by BANA can justify its position that Sundquist is an

29

errant decision.
Yet, in a vain attempt at justification, BANA takes the position that Sundquist is
an errant decision by attempting to convince this Court that it is good policy to over look
the 8000-plus illegal foreclosures that BANA performed through ReconTrust. This runs
contrary to the policy that this Court and the legislature have created and upheld for over
100 years: that a property owner cannot be taken advantage of because they are in
distress.
Ruling that the ReconTrust Trustee's Deed is void, however, brings to light
another issue: what happens to the homeowner that purchased the home in reliance on the
title company's statements that the Trustee's Deed is valid. The title insurance company
has an obligation to determine if the documents existing in a chain of title comply with
statues and indicate a clean title to real property. As one of the members of the group
that has the power of sale, the title insurance companies should have been on notice that
the ReconTrust Trustee's Deed is void. Therefore, either the current homeowner or the
previous home owner who was the subject of a void ReconTrust Trustee's Deed can, by
using §57-1-23.5, seek damages against the title insurance company issuing the title
policy. And, the title insurance company can in tum seek damages against BANA and
ReconTrust, thereby laying the burden of responsibility for violating the Utah Statutes on
whom it belongs.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should not reverse the District Court' s decision dismissing Distressed
Asset's unlawful detainer. The Adamsons are entitled to receive and should be awarded
their attorney's fees resulting from this appeal.

Dated this February 2

nd

,

R espectfully Submitted

20 16

•

Samuel D. and Courtney D. Adamson

•

jcb@.johnchristianbarlmv.com
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Brad G. DeHaan (USB No. 8168)
Richard Gunnerson (USB No. 10862)
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES
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3269 South Main Street, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone: (801) 263-3400
braci.dehaan@lundbergfinn.com
L&A Case No. 14-40881/VV
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, ST. GEORGE DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DISTRESSED ASSET SOLUTIONS FUND I,
LLC,
,.

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.

SAMUEL D. ADAMSON, COURTNEY D.
ADAMSON; and JOHN DOE/JANE
DOE/OCCUPANT,

Civil No.
Judge

Defendants.
Plaintiff Distressed Asset Solutions Fund I, LLC, by and through its cowisel, complains of
Defendants Samuel D. Adamson, Courtney D. Adamson, and John Doe/Jane Doe/Occupant and

alleges as follows:
PARTIES
I.

Plaintiff is a corporation with its principal place of business in the State of

California
Version I

Revised 1 I/25/2013

A-1

2.

Defendants are individuals residing in Washington County, State of Utah.
ruRISDICTION

3.

This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to §78A-5-

102, Utah Code Annotated
VENUE
4.

Venue is proper in this case pw-suant to §78B-3-301, Utah Code Annotated.
CAUSE OF ACTION

5.

On or about August 31, 2007, Samuel D. Adamson as trustor, executed and

delivered to Scott Lundberg, as Trustee, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as
nominee for Guild Mortgage Company its successors and assigns, as beneficiary, a Trust Deed to
secure the perfonnance by the trustor of his obligation under a Trust Deed Note (the "Note

0
)

executed and delivered for valid consideration to the beneficiary.
6.

The Trust Deed covered real property situated in Washington County, State of Utah,

located at 70 West Orchard Lane, Washington, UT 84780, more particularly described as follows:
ALL OF LOT 1HIRTY ONE (31), THE FIELDS - PHASE 1, according to the
official plat thereof, on file in the office of the recorder of Washington County, State
of Utah.
7.

The trustor defaulted in performing the provisions of the Trust Deed and Note, and,

pursuant to a Notice of Default and Election to Sell recorded in the Washington County Recorder's
Office on June 25, 2009, as Entry No. 20090024680, and a Notice of Sale, the property described in
said Trust Deed (the "Property") was sold at a trustee's sale on January 14, 2010 to BAC Home
/,'.';:-..
w
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Loans Servicing, LP FKA Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP ("BAC Home Loans"). A copy
of the Trustee's Deed is attached as Exhibit A.
8.

On December 18, 2013, Bank of America, N.A., successor by merger to BAC Home

Loans, transferred title to Plaintiff by virtue of a Quit Claim Deed ("Quitclaim Deed"). A copy of
the Quitclaim Deed is attached as Exhibit B.
9.
~

On January 6, 2014, the Quitclaim Deed was recorded with Washington County

Recorder's Office, as Enny No. 20140000387.
10.

Plaintiff gave good and valuable consideration for the Property without notice of any

claims to the Property.
11.

Plaintiff is a bona fide purchaser of the Property.

12.

Notably, on April 22, 2010, BAC Home Loans filed its own action against

Defendants in the Fifth District Court, Washington County for the State of Utah, identified as Case
No. 100501437, for unlawful detainer (the ''2010 Eviction Case").
13.

Defendants Samuel D. Adamson and Courtney D. Adamson in this action were the

same Defendants in the 2010 Eviction Case.

14.

The Property involved in this action is the same Property involved in the 2010

Eviction Case.
15.

On July 7, 2010, Defendants, through their counsel at the time, filed in the 2010

Eviction Case, a Motion and Memorandum in Support to Set Aside Sale.
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16.

On August 4, 2010, BAC Home Loans filed an Objection to the Motion to Set Aside

the Sale in the 2010 Eviction Case.
17.

On August 16, 2010, the Court in the 2010 Eviction Case scheduled a hearing on

September 1, 2010 to hear all pending motions, including Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Sale in
the 2010 Eviction Case.
18.

Neither BAC Home Loans, nor Defendants Samuel D. Adamson, Courtney D.

Adamson, appeared at the hearing on September 1, 2010 in the 2010 Eviction Case.
19.

On October 22, 2010, the Court in the 2010 Eviction Case entered an Order denying

Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Sale.
20.

But for a Notice of Office Relocation and Address Change filed on September 13,

2011 in the 2010 Eviction Case, no substantive action was taken by Defendants after October 22,
2010, the date the Court denied Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Sale.
{'

21.

On June 21, 2012, the Court dismissed the 2010 Eviction Case.

22.

Although Defendants were aware of possible claims to the Property as of July 7,

2010, the date they filed their Motion to Set Aside Sale in the 2010 Eviction Case, Defendants failed

.....

,',

to assert such rights, if any, after October 22, 2010, the date the Court denied Defendants' Motion to
Set Aside Sale.
23.

Defendants failed to take any action to set aside the trustee's sale on January 14,

2010 after October 22, 2010, the date the Court denied Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Sale.

4
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24.

Defendants have failed to pay any value to Plaintiff for possession of the Property

after January 6, 2014.
25.

Defendants have failed to pay any value to any party for possession of the Property

after January 14, 2010.
26.

Defendants have failed to pay property taxes on the Property after January 14, 2010.

27.

Defendants failed to record a lis pendens upon the Property after January 14, 2010.

28.

Defendants have occupied the Property since January 14, 2010.

29.

From and since January 14, 2010, Defendants have been tenants..at-will.

30.

On January 27, 2014, pursuant to Sections §78B-6-802.5, §78B-6-802 and §78B-6-

805, Utah Code Annotated, Plaintiff caused to be served on Defendants Notices to Quit, copies of
which are attached hereto as Exhibit C.
31.

The Notices to Quit infonned the Defendants that the Plaintiff had elected to

tenninate the tenancy-at-will and notified Defendants that their failme to vacate the Property within

five (5) days would result in their being in unlawful detainer.
32.

Defendants have failed to vacate and yield po~ession of the Property to the Plaintiff.

33.

Defendants are, therefore, in unlawful detainer of the Property as provided in

Section §78B-6-802.S and §78B-6-802, Utah Code Annotated.
34.

The fair rental value for the Property is $1,200.00 per month.

Said amount

constitutes damage to the Plaintiff occasioned by the Defendants' unlawful detainer.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants as follows:
5
Ver-ion I
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A.

Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants ordering said

Defendants to vacate the Property located at 70 West Orchard Lane, Washington, UT 84780, more
particularly described as follows:
ALL OF LOT THIRTY ONE (31), THE FIELDS - PHASE 1, according to the
official plat thereof, on file in the office of the recorder of Washington County, State
ofUtah
B.

Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants in the amount equal to

the daily fair rental value multiplied by the nwnber of days Defendant remains in the home
calculated from the expiration of the Notice to Quit. This amount to be trebled pursuant to U.C.A.
§78B-6-811 et seq., plus any damages occasioned to the Plaintiff as a result of the Defendants'
unlawful detention of the Subject Property.
C.

For Plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs incurred herein.

D.

Judgment for such additional and further relief as may be equitable.

DATED this 7'11 day of February, 2014.

~

Name: Jh-b
Attorney for Plaintiff

0\

D J:! ~
Q_

t=-- .-.

Plaintiff's Address: 7045 Larkspur Drive, Corona Del Mar, CA 92625
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NOTICE TO OUIT
Samuel D Adamson
70 West Orchard Lane
Washington, UT 84780
You are notifi~ pursuant to provisions of sections §78B-6-80'2.5 and §78B-6-802, Utah Code
Annotated. that you are required to vacate the property located at 70 West Orchard Lane,
Washington, UT 84780, more particularly descnoed as follows:

ALL OF LOT 1HIRTY ONE (31), nIE FILEDS -PHASE 1, according to the
official plat thereof: on file in the office of the recorder of Washington Co\Dlty, State
ofUtah
and surrender the possession thereof to Distressed Asset Solutions Fund I, LLC ("DASj within five
(S) days after service of this notice upon you.

On January 14, 2010, at 1:00 p.m., Recontrust Company, N.A., Trustee under a Trust Deed dated
August 31, 2007, and executed by Samuel D. Adamson, as trustor, in mvor of Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for. Guild Mortgage Company m successors and assigns,
caused the above referenced property to be sold at a public sale. At the sale, the property was sold
to DAS. Bank of America, N.A. subsequently transferred to Distressed Asset Solutions Fund I.
LLC by virtue of a Quit Claim Deed dated December 18, 2013 and recorded January 6, 2014. From
and since that time, you have been a tenant at will. DAS has elected to terminate said tmmcy.
In the event that you fail to vacate the property within five (5) days from the date on which you
receive this notice, you will be guilty of unlawful detainer as provided by sections §78B-6-802.S
and §788-6-SoZ Utah Code Annotated, and appropriate legal action will be instituted against you
for possession of the premises and for treble damages as provided for by section §7813-6-811, llmb

Code Annotated.
DATEDthis

t.J

dayofJanuary,2014.

Printed Name: (
o-.. g\ ] ) l. }\ A.A "'
Attorneys for DAS
3269 South Main Street, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411S
Telephone: (801) 263-3400
~

L&A Case No: 14-40881NV
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IMPORTANT NOTICE TO SERVICEMEMBERS AND THEIR DEPENDENTS:
PROTECTIONS UNDER THE SERVICEMEMBERS CIVll., REJJEF ACT
Servicemembers on "active duty" or "active service," or a dependent of such a servicemember
may be entitled to certain legal protections, including eviction protection, pursuant to the
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SO USC App.§§ S01-S96), as amended, (the "SCRAj and,
possibly, certain related state statutes.
Who may be entitled to Legal Protections under the SCRA:
• Active duty members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and
active service National Guard;
• Active service members of the commissioned corps of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration;
• Active service members of the commissioned corps of the Public Health Service;
• United States citizens servicing with the armed forces of a nation with which the United
States is allied in the prosecution of a war or military action; and
• Their spouses.
Servicemembers and dependents with questions about the SCRA should contact their unit's
Judge Advocate, or their installation's Legal Assistance Officer. A military legal assistance
office locator for all branches of the Armed Fo?CeS is available at
http://legalassistance.law.af.miJ/content/locator.php.
"Military OneSource" is the U.S. Department of Defense's information resource. If you are listed
as entitled to legal protections under the SCRA, please go to wwwJDilitaryonesource.com/scra or
call l-800-342-9647 (toll free from the United States) to find out more information. Dialing
instructions for areas outside the United States are provided on the website.

I

I

GJ
I

If you are such a servicem.ember, or a dependent of such a servicemember. you should contact
Lwdberg & Associates eviction department at (801) 263-3400 ext 398 to discuss your status under
theSCRA.
L&A Case No: 14-40881NV
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CSR Investigations
PO Box 3324
St. George, Utah 84771

PROOF OF SERVICE
(NOTICE TO QUIT)
Case No.14-40881 / W
I, Fredrick Neilson, being a resident of the state of UTAH, and a citizen of the United States of at least
18 years or age at the time of service herein, and not a part of or interested in the within action.
I received the within and hereto annexed, (NOTICE TO QUIT) on January 27, 2014 and served the same
upon Samuel D. Adamson, a within named occupant in said article(s) by posting a true copy of said
article(s) for the occupant the front door of the residence located at 70 West Orchard Lane, Washington,
Utah 84780 on January 28, 2014 at 7:35 AM
I further certify that at the time of service of the said article(s), I endorsed the date and place of service
and added my name and offlclal title thereto.
UCA 78B-5-705, I declare under criminal penalty that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on: January 28, 2014.

Private lnvestig tor

Utah License No. G-102697

TOTAL CHARGES: $40.00

NOTES
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NOTICE TO QUIT
John Doe/Jane Doe/Occupant
70 West Orchard Lane
Washingto~ UT 84780
@

You are notified, pursuant to provisions of sections §78B-6-802.5 and §78:B-6-802, Utah Code
Annotated, that you are required to vacate the property located at 70 West Orchard Lane,
Washington, UT 84780, more particularly described as follows:
ALL OF LOT THIRTY ONE (31), 1llE FILEDS - PHASE 1, according to the
official plat thereof, on file in the office of the recorder of Washington County, State
ofUtah
and surrender the possession thereof to Distressed Asset Solutions FlUld I, LLC ("DAS'') within

five {S) days after service of this notice upon you.
On January 14, 2010, at 1:00 p.m., Recontrust Company, N.A., Trustee under a Trust Deed dated

August 31, 2007, and executed by Samuel D. Adamson, as trustor, in favor of Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for Guild Mortgage Company its successors and amigos,
caused the above referenced property to be sold at a public sale. At the sale, the property was sold
to DAS.. Bank of America, N.A. subsequently 1J8DSferred to Distressed AJmet Solutions Fund I,
LLC by virtue of a Quit Claim Deed dated December 18, 2013 and recorded January 6, 2014. From
and since that time, you have been a tenant at will DAS bas elected to terminate P.aid tenancy.
You must hnm.ediately adyise Lundberg and Assoefates
property within 10 days from reeeipt of this notice.

tr you are a pap• oeeupyig !N!

In the event that you fail to vacate the property within ninety (90) days if you are a bona fide tenant,
as defined by Trtle VIl-Protectjng Tenant.q at Foreclosure Act or within five (S) days ftom the date
on which you receive this notice, if you are not a bona fide tenant, you will be guilty of unlawful
detainer as provided by sections §78:B-6-802.5 and §78B-6-802, Utah Code Annotated, and
appropriate legal action will be instituted against you for posse8mon of the premises and for treble
damages as provided for by section §78B-6-811, Utah Code Annotated. A bona fide tenant is
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defined as a renter or leasehold occupant paying fair market rental resulting from an arms length

transaction.
DATED this

-it

dayofJanuary,2014.

I

<@!

;

Printed Name:
Attomeys for DAS
3269 South Main Street, Suite 100

Salt Lake City, Utah 8411S
Telephone: (801) 263-3400

L&ACaseNo: 14-40881NV
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IMPORTANT NOTICE TO SERVICEMEMBERS AND THEIR DEPENDENTS:
PROTECTIONS UNDER THE SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT
Servicemembers on "active duty" or "active service," or a dependent of such a servicemember may be
entitled to certain legal protections, including eviction protection, pursuant to the Servicemembers Civil
Relief Act (SO USC App.§§ S01-S96), as amended, (the "SCRAj and, possibly, certain related state
statutes.
Who may be entitled to Legal Protections ander the SCRA:
•
•
•
•
•

Active duty members of the Anny, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and active
service National Guard;
Active service members of the commissioned corps of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration;
Active service members of the commissioned corps of the Public Health Service;
United States citizens servicing with the armed forces of a nation with which the United States is
allied in the prosecution of a war or military action; and
Their spouses.

Servicemembers and dependents with questions about the SCRA should contact their unit's Judge
Advocate, or their installation's Legal Assistance Officer. A military legal assistance office locator for all
branches of the Armed Forces is available at http:lnegalassistance.law.af.miJ/content/1ocator.pbp.
"Militmy OneSource" is the U.S. Department of Defense's information resource. If you are listed as
entitled to legal protections under the SCRA, please go to www.militaryonesource.com/scra or call 1-800342-9647 (toll free from the United States) to find out more information. Dialing instructions for areas
outside the United S1ates are provided on the website.

If you are such a servicemember, or a dependent of such a servicemember, you should contact Lundberg
& Associates eviction department at (801) 263-3400 ext 398 to discuu your status under the SCRA.
DISCLOSURE REGARDING:
PROTECTING TENANTS AT FORECLOS1JRE ACT

If you are a tenant, you may be allowed under Federal law to continue to occupy your nn1al unit until
your rental or lease agreement expires, or until 90 days after the sale of the property at auction, whichever
is later. If your rental or lease agreement expires after the 90-day period, you may need to provide a copy
of your rental or lease agreement to the new owner to prove your right to remain on the property longer
than the 90 days after the sale of the property.

You must continue to pay your rent and comply with all other requirements of your rental or lease
agreement or you will be subject to eviction for violating your rental or lease agreement.

L&A Case No: 14-40881NV

Rcvi!-rd I.H/2 V2H14
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CSR Investigations
PO Box 3324
St. George, Utah 84771

PROOF OF SERVICE
(NOTICE TO QUIT)
Case No.14-40881 / W
I, Fredrick Neilson, being a resident of the state of UTAH, and a citizen of the United States of at least
18 years or age at the time of service herein, and not a part of or interested in the within action.
I received the within and hereto annexed, (NOTICE TO QUIT) on January 27, 2014 and served the same
upon John Doe / Jane Doe / Occupant, a within named occupant in said article(s) by posting a true copy
of said article(s) for the occupant the front door of the residence located at 70 West Orchard Lane,
Washington, Utah 84780 on January 28, 2014 at 7:35 AM
I further certify that at the time of service of the said article(s). I endorsed the date and place of service
and added my name and official title thereto.
UCA 788-5-705, I declare under criminal penalty that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on: January 28, 2014.

Private lnvestlg tor
Utah License No. G-102697

TOTAL CHARGES: $10.00

NOTES
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DISTRESSED ASSET SOLUTIONS FUND
I, LLC,

DECISION AND ORDER DISMISSING
ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 140500067
SAMUEL D. ADAMSON; COURTNEY D.
ADAMSON; et al.,

Judge Jeffrey C. Wilcox

Defendants.

This is an action for unlawful detainer, which came on for trial on August 7, 2014, after
which the court took the matter under advisement. The court now dismisses this action for the
reasons given below.
Pursuant to Utah Code section 78B-6-802.5,
A previous owner, trustor, or mortgagor of a property is guilty of unlawful
detainer if the person:
(1) defaulted on his or her obligations resulting in disposition of the property by a
trustee's sale or sheriffs sale; and
(2) continues to occupy the property after the trustee's sale or sheriffs sale after
being served with a notice to quit by the purchaser.
At trial, Plaintiff presented as exhibits certified copies of the notice of default, the trust
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deed, and its own quitclaim deed, thus making out a prima facie case under the statute. 1

In defense, however, Defendants raised the issue of whether subdivision (l)'s
requirement of''disposition of the property by a trustee's sale'' has been satisfied.2 There appears
to be no question that Defendants defaulted on their obligations under a note secured by a trust
deed, and that ReconTrust, acting as trustee, gave notice of default and intention to sell the
property, and ultimately conducted a trustee's sale in January 2010, purporting to sell the
~

property to Plaintiff's predecessor in interest.
Defendants argue that because the 2010 trustee's sale was conducted by ReconTrust, who
was not a qualified trustee with the power of sale under Utah Code sections 57-1-21 and 57-1-23,
~Fed.Nat. Mortgage Ass'n v. Sundquist, 2013 UT 45, ,I 13,311 P.3d 1004 ("ReconTrust is
neither a member of the Utah State Bar nor a title insurance company or agency with an office in
the State of Utah. ReconTrust was therefore not a qualified trustee with the power of sale under
Utah Code sections 57-1-21 and 57-1-23."); i!6149 ("As a national bank operating in Utah

1

Plaintiff also agreed to file, after trial, a certified copy of the 2007 trust deed, but thus
far has not done so.
2

In addressing this defense, the court considers, in addition to the evidence and
argwnents presented at trial, the briefing submitted on Defendants' Motion for Declaratory
Judgment. At trial, the court indicated that it would not grant such motion at that time because
there was nothing in Defendants' pleadings suggesting that they were seeking declaratory relief.
However, also as indicated at trial, the motion addresses the substance of Defendants' defense, so
the court references such briefing as a matter of convenience. Plaintiff's opposition memorandum
filed May 23, 2014, is referenced herein as "Mem. Opp."
2
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under the (National Banking Act], ReconTrust is precluded from exercising the power of a
trustee under Utah statute for purposes of conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure."), the sale and
resulting trust deed are null and void ab initio.
As Plaintiff correctly notes, the Sundguist court expressly declined to decide what effect,
if any, its determination that ReconTrust did not qualify as a trustee with the power of sale would
have on the validity of the sale and resulting trust deed. See liL 1 50 ("Our opinion in this matter
is limited to the narrow issue of whether Utah law regarding the qualification of trustees is
preempted by the [National Banking Act]. In briefing and oral argument, the parties have
attempted to raise a variety of other issues relating to the validity of the nonjudicial foreclosure
sale, the validity of the trustee's deed, and the propriety of the order of restitution. Because these
issues were not fully litigated below, we decline to reach them on interlocutory appeal.'').
However, as Plaintiff also points out, the Court of Appeals has been presented with
arguments similar to those of Defendants, and has not even considered it necessary to reach them
where the party attacking the validity of a trustee's sale failed to allege or prove how its rights
were affected by the defect complained of. For example, in RM Lifesn,les, LLC v. Ellison, 2011
UT App 290, 263 P.3d 1152, the defendants in an unlawful detainer action "argued that the trust
deed sale was void because [the trustee] recorded the notice of default before it had been
substituted as trustee, that the statute did not allow [the beneficiary] to ratify [the trustee's]
action, and that the execution of the substitution of trustee violated the statute of frauds." Id., 1
3
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15. On review, the Court of Appeals declined to "reach the merits of these issues because the
[defendants], in attacking the trust deed sale's validity after the sale, ha[d] not met their burden
of proving that the alleged irregularity affected their rights," id. (footnote omitted), and "[did] not
claim that they were denied the right to cure the default or ever planned on or were capable of
curing the default." hh, 118 (citation omitted).
Similarly, in Reynolds v. Woodall, 2012 UT App 206,285 P.3d 7, the plaintiff argued
~

''that the trustee's sale [was] void" because the individual who "recorded the notice of default and
held the trustee's sale" did so "before [the beneficiary] executed and recorded a written
substitution of trustee." 14:., ,r 13. The plaintiff also challenged the beneficiary's later "attempt to
ratify [this individual's] actions after the trustee sale." ML, In other words, like Defendants here,
the plaintiff attacked the validity of the sale based on the questionable authority of the one who

'@

conducted it. Again, the Court of Appeals declined to decide these issues on their merits based on
the fact that, "in attacking the validity of the trustee's sale, [the plaintiff] ha[d] not alleged that
the challenged substitution of trustee impacted her rights." Id.
In contrast to RM Lifestyles and Reynolds are two cases cited by Defendants. First, in an

early Utah Supreme Court case, the court held a trust sale void where it was not performed by the
person authorized under the deed of trust:
The deed of trust authorized the sale to be made by the United States Marshal.
This was not done. One of his deputies made the sale as auctioneer. It is not
claimed that he acted as deputy, but simply that a person who was a deputy acted
4
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as the auctioneer. Nor do we think that the marshal could have acted by deputy,
unless the deed of trust had shown express authority to that effect, which it did not
do. The fact that no injuzy or fraud in the sale has been shown, does not affect the
question. Nor is it affected by the fact, that the purchaser was an innocent party.
The sale was made by one not authorized to make it, and cannot be upheld. It is
simply void, and no one gains any rights under it. A purchaser must know that the
sale is made by the proper person. The deed of trust shows who could make the
sale. A trustee can no doubt employ an auctioneer to act for him in crying off the
property; but the trustee must be present and superintend the sale. The trustee in
the present instance says that he does not think he was present at the sale.
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Chalmers. 2 Utah 542, 546-47 (Utah Terr. 1880) (emphasis added).
More recently, the Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court ruling that a nonjudicial
foreclosure sale for delinquent assessments owed to a condominium association was void where
the sale was conducted by the association's attorney because "[t]he record reveal[ed] that, though
its attorney may have qualified as a trustee under the Trust Deed Act, the Association failed to
appoint its attorney as such." McOueen v. Jordan Pines Townhomes Owners Ass1n, Inc., 2013
UT App 53, 11 19-21 & 28, 298 P.3d 666.
Notably, the McOueen court does not discuss the obstacles to setting aside a trustee sale
that were mentioned, and indeed dispositive, in the RM Lifestyles and Reynolds cases, as
summarized above. Rather, the court simply addressed the claimed defect-the absence of the
statutorily required qualified appointed trustee - on its merits, and agreed that it rendered the sale
void. Reconciliation of these cases is difficult.
Reconciliation of Singer with RM Lifestyles and Reynolds is also difficult. To say, as do

5
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these later cases, that a party attacking the validity of a trustee sale must allege that the claimed
defect resulted in an injury to "the interests of the debtor," or "some attendant fraud or unfair
dealing," RM Lifestyles, 2011 UT App 290, ~ 16, or a circumstance "reach[ing] unjust
extremes," id.; Reynolds, 2012 UT App 206, ~ 15, is plainly at odds with Singer's statement that,
where an unauthorized person conducts the sale, "[t]he fact that no injury or fraud in the sale has
been shown, does not affect the question." 2 Utah at 547.
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Singer on the ground that the deed of trust in that case
specified who could conduct the sale, and that there is no such provision in the trust deed here.
Plaintiff also notes that Singer was decided well before the current governing statutes, and
criticizes Defendants for not providing any additional authority to support their argument that the
sale here is void.
Plaintiff's arguments are unpersuasive. First, the provisions in Utah Code sections 57-121 and 57-1-23 restricting who is authorized to conduct a trustee's sale are clearly comparable to
the trust deed provision identifying who was authorized to conduct the sale in Singer, particularly
since "a contract," such as the trust deed here, ''implicitly contains the laws existing at the time it
was entered."3 Washington Nat. Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Associates, 795 P.2d 665,669 (Utah Ct.

3

It is unnecessary to decide which law to apply here (i.e., the law in effect in August
2007, when the trust deed was executed, or the law in effect in January 2010, when the trust sale
occurred) since the statutory provisions defining a qualified trustee did not change between these
periods.
6
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App. 1990) (citing, among other cases, Beehive Med. Elecs., Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 583 P.2d 53,
60 (Utah 1978) (citing Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595,601, 24 L.Ed. 793 (1878) (holding that
contracts embrace laws which affect their validity, construction, discharge, and enforcement)));
59 C.J.S. Mortgages§ 739 (WestlawNext database updated June 2014) ("The power to sell under
deed of trust is [a] matter of contract between [the] mortgagor and mortgagee under the tenns
and conditions expressed in [the] deed of trust instrument. It cannot be enlarged beyond the tenns
of the contract and the incomorated relevant statutes.") (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).
Thus, this attempted distinction fails.
Second, while Singer is an older case, it is consistent with prevailing law on the subject
today, as well as with current Utah statutory law. As a leading treatise on real estate financing
explains:
Generally, defects in the exercise of a power of sale can be categorized in at least
three ways - void, voidable, or inconsequential.
Some defects are so substantial that they render the sale void. In this situation,
neither legal nor equitable title transfers to the sale purchaser or subsequent
grantees, except perhaps by adverse possession.... A sale ... is void when
someone other than the named trustee conducts the sale, including a successor
who has not been validly appointed, or, conversely, if the original trustee conducts
the sale after a successor-trustee has been appointed.
Most defects render the foreclosure voidable and not void. When a voidable error
occurs, bare legal title passes to the sale purchaser, subject to the redemption
rights of those injured by the defective foreclosure. Typically, a voidable error is
"an irregularity in the execution of a foreclosure sale" and must be "substantial or
result in a probable unfairness." ... If the defect only renders the sale voidable,
7
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the redemption rights can be cut off if a bona fide purchaser for value acquires the
land. When this occurs, an action for damages against the foreclosing mortgagee
or trustee may be the only remaining remedy.
Finally, some defects are so inconsequential that they render the sale neither void
nor voidable. These defects commonly involve minor discrepancies in the notice
of sale....
Grant S. Nelson, Dale A. Whitman et al, Real Estate Finance Law § 7:21 at 953-957 (6th ed.
2014) (hereinafter Nelson & Whitman) (underscoring added and footnotes omitted; italics in
~

original).
Viewed within this framework, Singer clearly takes its place in the first category, and the
prerequisites to setting aside a sale identified in RM Lifestyles and Reynolds are seen to be
applicable only to those defects properly categorized as rendering a sale voidable rather than
void. This is consistent with Singer, which expressly disavows any such prerequisites as to a sale

~

conducted by one not authorized to do so. It is also consistent with McOueen, which affirmed
that a sale was void based only on the fact that the person who conducted it had not been
appointed as a trustee as statutorily required.
The limited applicability of the prerequisites stated in RM Lifestyles and Reynolds is also
shown by examination of the cases cited therein. For instance, both cases quote the statement
made in Concepts, Inc. v. First Sec. Realty Servs., Inc., 743 P.2d 1158, I 160 (Utah 1987) (per
curiam), that "[a] sale once made will not be set aside unless the interests of the debtor were
sacrificed or there was some attendant fraud or unfair dealing." 2011 UT App 290, ,I 16; 2012
8
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UT App 206, ~ 14. Concepts involved the attempted invalidation of a sale based on the fact that
the notice of sale, which was printed in 1983, incorrectly stated that the sale was to be conducted
on a given date in 1982, see 743 P.2d at 1159-a defect that the court ultimately characterized as
a "minor typographical error." Id. at 1161. Thus, the statement quoted is clearly taken from a case
falling into the third category described above (one involving "minor discrepancies in the notice
of sale"), not one involving what Singer held to be a fundamental error. 4
Similarly, RM Lifestyles and Reynolds each state that a trustee's sale should be set aside
"only in cases which reach unjust extremes." 2011 UT App 290, ~ 16; 2012 UT App 206, 115.
For this proposition, RM Lifestyles cites Thomas v. Johnson, 80 I P.2d 186, 188 (Utah Ct. App.
1990), which in tum cited Concepts, ~ id., and which involved only a challenge to the manner
in which the sale was conducted- namely, the trustee's acceptance of a bid offering to pay "fair
market value" (rather than a specific dollar amount) for the property. The court rejected this
challenge, holding that the statute was satisfied by the bid and "find[ing] no evidence that [the

4

Significantly, Concepts actually reiterates the underlying principle from Singer
(although with a different focus in mind-namely, the party intended to benefit from statutory
notice requirements), that "[t]he maker of the deed of trust with power of sale may condition the
exercise of the power upon such conditions as he may describe." 743 P.2d at 1160 (citing
Houston First American Savings v. Musick, 650 S.W.2d 764, 768 (Tex. 1983)) (emphasis
omitted). The cited case elaborates, as noted in Concepts, saying that "[t]he grantor of the power
[of sale] is entitled to have his directions obeyed; to have the proper notice of sale given; to have
it to take place at the time and place, and by the person appointed by him." 650 S.W.2d at 768
(emphasis added and citation omitted).
9
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debtor's] interests were sacrificed by the trustee's action ...." Id. at 189.5 RM Lifestyles and
Reynolds also cite Thrun v. Dewsnup, 2003 UT 47, ,I,I 36-37, 86 P.3d 699, which again merely
reiterated the holding of Concepts, and which, like Concepts, involved - as pertinent here - only
a challenge to the sufficiency of the notice of the sale given to the debtor. Id.
Thus, none of the cases cited to support the prerequisites identified in RM Lifestyles and
Reynolds involved "a purported sale by an unauthorized person," which is to be distinguished
~

from cases in which there is merely "a question of procedural irregularities in a trustee's sale."
Citizens Bank of Edina v. W. Quincy Auto Auction, Inc., 742 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Mo. 1987) (en
bane). Where, as here (and as in Singer), there is "a completely unauthorized sale conducted by
an individual who was powerless to sell the property," it is irrelevant "[w]hether in point of fact,
the sale of the property was conducted in all respects judiciously or not, or in a manner most

w

conducive to the interests of those concerned," although "[t]his would be a legitimate inquiry in a
proceeding to set aside a sale made under the power conferred by the instrument. ..." Id.
(citation omitted). This conclusion is inconsistent with Reynolds, but that case must yield to
Singer based on the principle that "[t]he Court of Appeals simply cannot overrule the law as

5

Thomas also included a footnote summarily rejecting the debtor's additional challenge
in that case to the trustee's acceptance of a credit bid rather than "requir[ing] the bid to be
'payable in lawful money of the United States at the time of sale,' as allegedly instructed in the
trust deed"- a provision that, if it existed, the court held to be satisfied by the credit bid. See 801
P.2d at 188 n.1.
10
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announced by the highest court in the state, even if the announcement was made decades ago."
Sentry Investigations, Inc. v. Davis, 841 P.2d 732, 735 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Plaintiff also relies on the holding in Reynolds that, "[a]bsent such exceptional
circumstances [i.e., harm to the interests of the debtor, fraud, unfair dealing, or unjust extremes],
the proper remedy is to seek an injunction prior to a sale, which allows a debtor to challenge
irregularities and protect her rights before the sale is completed and a trustee's deed is executed
and delivered to the purchaser." 2012 UT App 206, ,I 15 (citing RM Lifestyles, 2011 UT App
290, ,I 15 n.4 (internal citation omitted)) (emphasis added). Because, as just discussed,
Reynolds's requirement of harm, etc. as a prerequisite to setting aside a trustee's sale must be
limited (under Singer) to those cases involving defects rendering a sale voidable rather than void,
the companion requirement that challenges to irregularities be raised via a pre-sale injunction
proceeding, except where harm, etc., is shown, must likewise be so limited. To hold otherwise
would be to say that a debtor need not attempt to obtain a pre-sale injunction in a case in which
the sale is only voidable (because it may be set aside thereafter by a showing of harm, etc.), but
that such an attempt must be made where the sale is utterly void.
Additionally, Plaintiff argues that "the doctrines of waiver and estoppel bar Defendants'
claim that the Foreclosure Sale is void and should be set aside." Mem. Opp. at 9. To support this
argument, Plaintiff observes that
Defendants did not challenge the Foreclosure Sale before it occurred. It is
11
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undisputed that the Foreclosure Sale took place in January 2010. It is also
undisputed that although the Defendants in this case filed a class-action suit in
federal court in November 20 I0, they have not prosecuted their claims in the
Federal Action since the ruling in Garrett in September 2013, which ruled that a
foreclosure sale done in Utah by ReconTrust was valid. It is undisputed that
Defendants filed a Motion to Set Aside the Foreclosure Sale in the Prior State
Case in July 2010, but failed to prosecute this claim, and allowed the case to be
dismissed on June 21, 2012. Importantly, although the Defendants in this case
were, or are, parties in the Prior State Action and Federal Action respectively, they
failed to ever record a lis pendens on the Property. It is also undisputed that
Defendants have failed to pay any value, and have failed to pay property taxes, for
the Property since June 2009. Like the mortgagor in American Falls Canal
Securities Co., the Defendants in this case have failed to properly and timely
assert their rights to defeat the rights of Plaintiff, an innocent bona fide purchaser.
Defendants have knowingly and silently sat on any alleged rights they have to the
Property, and most importantly, have allowed Plaintiff to expend money
purchasing the Property. Defendants do not claim they had the ability to cure the
default and stop the Foreclosure Sale. Defendants did not challenge the sale before
it occU1Ted, and therefore, the Trustee's Deed from ReconTrust must remain
valid. [FN] 1
[FN]l Even if the court considered a trustee's deed voidable, "[a] voidable deed ..
. 'is unassailable in the hands of a [bona fide purchaser]."' See SEC v. Madison
Real Estate Group, LLC, 647 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1279 (D. Utah 2009) (citation
omitted).
Mem. Opp. at 9-10.

In the American Falls case cited, the Supreme Court recognized that "a party otherwise in
position to object to a mortgage foreclosure sale may well be precluded from doing so based
upon conduct sufficient to bring into operation the doctrines of waiver and estoppel." Am. Falls
Canal Sec. Co. v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 775 P.2d 412,414 (Utah 1989) (footnotes omitted).
The court indicated, however, that a party may not waive the right to challenge, or be estopped
12
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from challenging, a sale wholly void, see id. ("(E]xcept where non-compliance results in a
complete legal nullizy. one otherwise entitled to object to a judicial sale in mortgage foreclosure
proceedings as involving a defect or irregularity based upon a lack of or insufficient process,
notice, advertisement or other designation with respect to the sale, designed for his benefit and
protection, may waive, or be estopped from asserting, such defect or irregularity.") (emphasis
added and citation omitted);~ also Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, ~ 22, 189 P.3d 51, 57
(distinguishing "' ... between an illegal or void contract and one merely ultra vires,' which could
become enforceable by ratification or estoppel") (quoting Millard Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State Bank
of Millard Cnty., 80 Utah 170, 14 P.2d 967, 971-72 ( 1932)), which, under Singer, is what results
from a trustee's sale conducted by one not having authority.6
Moreover, even where it has been said that "(a] want of authority in the trustee making
the sale may be waived by the parties in interest, or they may estop themselves by their conduct
to object to such want of authority, at least as against the purchaser at the sale," 59 C.J.S.
Mortgages§ 764 (WestlawNext database updated June 2014) (citing Reynolds v. Kroff, 144 Mo.
433, 46 S.W. 424 (1898); Spencer v. Hawkins, 39 N.C. 288, 4 Ired. Eq. 288, 1846 WL 1113

6

Plaintiff relies on Ockey. which held that a conveyance effected by trustees after the
termination of the trust ''was merely voidable" rather than void,~ 2008 UT 37, ,I 24, and on
Millard County, which held that securities issued by a bank in excess of its statutory authority
were likewise only voidable, see id., 122, but these cases did not involve a trustee's foreclosure
sale, in which context the clear rule is shown by Singer and the other authorities discussed above.
13
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(1846); Schwarz v. Kellogg. 243 S.W. 179 (Mo. 1922)), the conduct giving rise to the waiver or
estoppel in the cited cases was considerably more affirmative than anything Defendants are
alleged to have done here.
Certainly, Defendants' failure to pay taxes or any other value for the property since June
2009,7 while remaining in possession, is understandably frustrating for the foreclosure sale
purchaser (or its successor in interest), but it is not inconsistent with their claim that the sale is
vii

void,8 nor can their failure to affirmatively pursue judicial vindication of their position during
this period properly be so characterized.9 g: Hammon v. Hatfield, 192 Minn. 259, 261, 256
1

At trial, Mr. Adamson actually acknowledged not having made payments since
December 2008, explaining that, since April 2010, their lender refused to accept any payments.
8

Indeed, under the circumstances, it would be the making of payments to the purchaser at
the sale, or to its successor in interest, that would be would be inconsistent with Defendants'
claim.
9

Defendants' federal class-action lawsuit (initiated in November 2010), was stayed
pending the outcome of Garrett v. ReconTrust Co., N.A., 546 F. App'x 736 (10th Cir. 2013)
(which, contrary to Plaintifrs suggestion, did not unqualifiedly hold ''that ReconTrust had the
authority to act as a trustee in Utah, and therefore, the foreclosure sale that took place in the
Garrett case was valid," Mem. Opp. at 3), and appears to remain pending. Resolution of the
"Prior State Case" (case number 100501437 in this court) is difficult to follow. This was an
unlawful detainer action filed against Defendants by Plaintiffs predecessor in interest, and
appears to have been dismissed due to the failure of both sides to appear at a hearing on or about
June 19, 2012. (The Order of Dismissal is a minute entry for a hearing that appears to have been
held on June 19, 2012 (the date of the caption), but the signature line on the order is dated June
20, 2012, which is also the file stamp date, and the order was filed in CORIS on June 21, 2012.)
However, the parties in the case had previously stipulated to continue the scheduled trial
"without date," an order to that effect was entered on November 17, 2011, and no prior notice of
any hearing scheduled thereafter appears in CORIS.
14

N.W. 94, 95 (1934) (property occupants claiming under mortgagor one year after void
foreclosure sale were "rightfully in possession" and could not be barred from challenging the
validity of such sale by statute requiring any challenge to be brought "with reasonable diligence,"
the principle being that "one who is himself in the legal enjoyment of his property cannot have
his rights therein forfeited to another, for failure to bring suit against that other within a time
specified to test the validity of a claim which the latter asserts, but takes no steps to enforce. It
has consequently been held that a statute which, after a lapse of five years, makes a recorded
deed purporting to be executed under a statutory power conclusive evidence of a good title, could
not be valid as a limitation law against the original owner in possession of the land. Limitation
laws cannot compel a resort to legal proceedings by one who is already in the complete
enjoyment of all he claims.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The same is true of
Defendants' failure to file a lis pendens, as they have explained, since a void sale transfers no
title under Singer, and there was no need to bring their challenge prior to the sale, as discussed
above.
Plaintiff argues that some of the same conduct just discussed also constituted a
ratification of the foreclosure sale, but the court disagrees for the same reasons such conduct is
not an estoppel or waiver, not least of which is the fact that, as Plaintiff itself recognizes, "[a]

r-.

~

contract or a deed that is void cannot be ratified or accepted ....'' Ockey, 2008 UT 37, ~ 18
(footnote omitted).
15

Plaintiff also argues that the statutory remedy set forth in Utah Code section 57-1-23.5 is
exclusive, but this section was not added until 2011, the year after the sale at issue here, and
Plaintiff has made no argument to show its retroactive applicability.
Finally, Plaintiff stresses that it is a bona fide purchaser for value. Assuming that to be
true, 10 however, Singer clearly holds that such status cannot validate a void sale. This
determination is not altered by Utah Code section 57-1-28's provision stating that trust deed
'J>

"recitals of compliance with the requirements of Sections 57-1-19 through 57-1-36 relating to the
exercise of the power of sale and sale of the property described in the trustee's deed" "are
conclusive evidence in favor of bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers for value and without
notice.'' Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-28(2)(c)(ii).
For obvious reasons, such provisions cannot be taken completely at face value. See

~

Nelson & Whitman§ 7.22 at 982 (describing "[t]he literal language of this ... type of statute" as
"breathtakingly broad in its impact on BFPs" as it "arguably applies even when the mortgagee
had no substantive right to foreclose," such as where "a lender forecloses though the secured
obligation is not in default or if the mortgage is forged" - a result that would be "fundamentally

unfair and is probably legislatively unintended"). In an earlier treatment of the subject, Nelson

10

Such an assumption may be unduly generous, given that Defendants have remained in
possession of the property challenging the validity of the sale at all times since the sale, thereby
giving notice to Plaintiff, prior to Plaintiff's purchase, of the claimed defect in the exercise of the
power of sale.
16
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and Whitman went as far as to assert that "the conclusive impact" of such statutes should be
limited "to procedural defects in the foreclosure process," consistent with the likely legislative
intent. See Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Refonning Foreclosure: The Unifonn
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 Duke L.J. 1399, 1506-1507 (2004).
Although this suggested bright-line limitation did not find its way into the most recent
version of Nelson and Whitman's treatise, it appears to accurately reflect how these "conclusive"
statutory presumptions should be understood. See Main I Ltd. P'ship v. Venture Capital Const. &
Dev. Com.~ 154 Ariz. 256,260, 741 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (observing, with
reference to an Arizona conclusive presumption statute similar to that of Utah, and without
apparent disagreement, that "[w]hen the California cases hold that recitals in a deed of trust are
conclusive, they qualify that they are conclusive 'in the absence of grounds for eguitable relief,"'
but finding equitable relief inappropriate in a case where there was no "fraud, misrepresentation,
... concealment," bad faith, or breach of fiduciary duty) (emphasis added and citation omitted).
Among the traditional grounds for equitable relief not specifically mentioned in Main I is, as
previously indicated, the absence of a power of sale in the party conducting such sale. See 5
Tiffany Real Prop.§ 1550 (3d ed.) (WestlawNext database updated September 2013) ("It appears
that the sale will ordinarily be set aside in equity on grounds on which it would have been
previously enjoined, as for instance where the debt never existed, or has been extinguished, or
was conducted by a pa.ny without authority to do so, or where the notice of sale was substantially
17
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defective.") (emphasis added and footnotes omitted). Thus, the court concludes that the
protection afforded to BFPs by Utah Code section 57-1-28 is not intended to extend, and does
not extend, to protect against defects traditionally viewed as fundamental, such as the one at issue
here.
For these reasons, the court holds that Plaintiff has not overcome Defendants' defense
that there has been no "disposition of the property by a trustee's sale," as required under Utah
iii;

Code section 78B-6-802.5, and accordingly dismisses this unlawful detainer action.
ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that:
1. Plaintiffs' unlawful detainer action is dismissed.
Dated this Q.tJ'--day of September, 2014.
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Page 1 (last)

1

to know what they did when they received the

2

notice of default.

3

from your clients as to what they did,

4

they attended the sale.

5

and I

think I
MR.

6

What

I would like some evidence

I have no idea on that,

need that background to help me.
BARLOW:

Okay,

yes,

Judge,

we can do

I would like to do is call Mr. Sam

7

that.

8

Adamson to the stand.
Thank you.

THE COURT:

9

whether

10

you'd raise your right hand,

11

administer an oath,

12

seat in the witness stand.

13

Whereupon,

Mr.

Adamson,

if

the clerk will

and then you can come take a

SAMUEL ADAMSON,

14

was administered the following oath by the court
16

clerk.
THE CLERK:

17

You do solemnly swear that

18

the testimony you give in the case now pending

19

before the court will be the truth,

20

truth,

21

the whole

and nothing but the truth.
THE

v-JITNESS:

1

do.

22
23

DIRECT EXAMINATION

24

BY MR.

25

Q

BARLOW:
Mr.

Adamson,

will you please state and

MARY BETH COOK, CSR, RPR
(435)
161 South 200 West
Cedar City,

868-1075
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1

spell your name for the record.

?

A

Samuel Don Adamson.

3

Q

Please spell your name for the record.

4

A

S-A-M-U-E-L,

5

Don D-O-N,

Adamson

A-D-A-M-S-O-N.

6

Q

Mr.

Adamson,

you've heard the

judge ask

7

specific questions.

8

you please tell the Court when you moved into the

9

property and where

10

A

The property is located at

Orchard Lane,

13
1 <l

will you please first

Will

state

where the property is located?

11

12

Let's go through those.

Q

Washington,

70 West

Utah 84780.

Will you please state when you moved

into the property.

15

A

We moved into the property May of 2003.

16

Q

May of 2003?

17

A

Correct.

THE COURT:

18

And

19

you purchased the home.

20

for,

21

your

How much you purchased it

if you financed it and what the terms of
what your payments were.

22

THE WITNESS:

23

THE

24

THE WITNESS:

25

just tell me briefly,

154,000,

COURT:

Originally?
Yeah.

It was right around

and the terms were 30 years,

COOK, CSR, RPR
( 435)
161 South 200 West
Cedar City,

MARY BETH
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1

payments were $1,190.

THE COURT:

2
3

over the questioning,

4

take it?

5

THE WITNESS:

6

THE COURT:

7

that

just a

THE WITNESS:

9

consolidate some debt.

11

but did you refinance,

Correct,

I

in 2007.

And can you tell me about

little bit?

8

THE COURT:

10

And I don't mean to take

We refinanced to

And what were the terms;

do

you remember?
I

THE WITNESS:

12
13

little bit,

14

$1,900 a month for

15

amount financed.

16

might be off on this a

but -- our payment was right around

THE

30 years.

COURT:

I

can't remember the

And that's fine.

And who

17

did you refinance it through?

18

company but do you remember who your debt was to?

19

Was

20
21
22

Not the mortgage

it Bank of America?
THE WITNESS:

originally,

It was Guild Mortgage

and then it sold to Bank of America.

MR.

BARLOW:

Judge,

I

think I

have on

23

here that Guild Mortgage was the finance company

24

and then i t sold to -- not Bank of America but

25

Countrywide and then Bank of America.
MARY BETH COOK, CSR, RPR
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THE COURT:

1
2

THE {l\1ITNESS:

4

THE COURT:

Guild Mortgage.

MR.

7

THE WITNESS:

8

THE COURT:

BARLOW:

That's what

wouldn't mind,

11

more.

12

having trouble making payments;

And I

Adamson,

I

~

so if you

I'm going to ask a

is that right?
In December of

Correct.

owned a landscape maintenance company.

14

2008

15

that time the transmission went out on my work

16

truck and took my funds that

17

the winter since i t ' s a

18

contacted Bank of America before I

19

first payment and let them know of my hardship.

20

They continued to tell me that they would work

21

with me and to stay in contact,
MR.

22

DeHAAN:

had set aside for
I

even missed my

for which T did.

24

of America is not a party.

on the basis of hearsay.

THE COURT:

At

I'm going to object to

that,

Your Honor,

I

seasonal business.

23

Bank

It's not coming in for the

MARY BETH COOK, CSR, RPR
(435)
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few

take it that at some point you were

THE WITNESS:

13

have.

I'm going to allow both

counsel to follow up on questions,
Mr.

I

That sounds right.

10

25

~

It was Countrywide do you

think?

6

9

It was who

initially?

3

5

I 'm sorry.

868-1075
UT 84720
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1

truthfulness of the matter asserted.

2

in for background,

It's coming

and I'm going to allow it.

And I guess at some point you learned

3

4

that there was a foreclosure.

5

notice of default?

6

THE WITNESS:

7

THE COURT:

Did you receive a

Correct.
Counsel,

would you ask him

8

if this would be the document that he received.

9

BY MR.

10

Q

BARLOW:

Mr.

Adamson,

I

believe you've

Is

that the document that

11

handed Exhibit No.

12

you received issued by ReconTrust?

13
14

A

years since I

15

16

It

Q

A

reviewed it but,

yes.

sent to you or taped

How did you receive this document?

Recalling,

taped to my door.

THE COURT:

18

It's been a few

looks familiar.

Was this document

to your door?

17

1.

just been

What did you do after you

19

found that it had been taped to your door;

20

recall?

THE WITNESS:

21

I

did try several times to

22

do a

loan modification at that time.

23

back a little bit on time frame?

24

THE COURT:

25

THE WITNESS:

do you

Can I

go

Sure.

I did originally miss

MARY BETH COOK, CSR, RPR
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1

December's payment of 2008.

Stayed in contact

2 with Bank of America January and February because
3

those were sti..1.l

4

started picking back up for the year and contacted

S

them to make a payment because they agreed every

6

month that

7

work with me to get caught

In March I

had

had contacted them that they would

At that point

8

9

I

my slow months.

I

back up.
was notified that

would have to come up with the

7,000 that

I

I

was

simply stated that that's not really

10

behind,

and I

11

working with me.

12

back up.

13

young in life,

14

myself,

15

qualify;

that they would be sending me paperwork

16

to sign,

and that

17

them which I

18

get back to them.

That's me

just getting caught

So not really knowing what to do being
I

did try loan modifications by

was told by Bank of America that

I

T did

was to get i t right back to

never saw any paperwork to sign and

In fall of 2009 I hired a company that

19
20

was a

loan modification specialist called

21

Fortified Financial and paid them a

22

money to help them assist to figure this out.

23

BY MR.

24

Q

How much did you pay that company?

25

A

$3,700.

BARLOW:

MARY BETH COOK, CSR, RPR
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THE COURT:

1

Did you ever try and contact

2

ReconTrust company or counsel about the notice of

3

default?

~

THE WITNESS:

4

I

never would have thought

5

to call or contact ReconTrust.

Fortified

6

Financial and me did get Bank of America and

7

ReconTrust on a three-way call because we had a

8

concern about the sale date.

9

exactly the year.

I can't remember

You might have it on record.

10

One company is stating it was sold in February

11

where the other company is stating it sold in

12

March.

13

on the phone with us about it but later hung up on

14

us because they found out we were recording their

15

phone call.

16
17

They did continue to get into an argument

THE COURT:

Did you ever hear or get a

copy of a notice of trustee sale?
WITNESS:

18

THE

19

THE COURT:

Sorry,

what was that?

Did you ever receive or get

20

a copy of a notice of trustee sale that told you

21

when the date of the sale would be?

22

THE WITNESS:

I

received one in February

23

but not on the day that I

believe it was

24

ReconTrust states in March.

25

or received anything on that date.

I never saw a posting
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1

?.

THE COURT:

Uid you attend the trustee

sale?

.3

THE WITNESS:

4

THF:

5

COURT:

I did not.
Did you know that it was

occurring?
THE WITNESS:

6

Not the one in March.

We

7

were working with Rank of America at the time.

8

were actually in the middle of another loan

9

modification when we received our eviction notice

We

10

on April 1 st ,

11

because we were working with them up to that date

12

on the phone several times a week with Fortified

13

Financial to resolve this problem.

14

2010,

and it was a surprise to us

THE COURT:

The trustee's deed says that

15

the sale occurred on January 14 th of 2010,

16

you're saying that you didn't attend that sale?

17

THE WITNESS:

18

THE COURT:

19

questions

I

I did not.

All right.

Those are the

have.

Mr.

20

No,

and

Barlow,

t:i,;

I'm going to allow you to

21

provide any other questions that you think would

22

be necessary and then I ' l l allow

23

cross-examination.

24

BY MR.

25

Q

BARLOW:
Mr.

Adamson,

you mentioned a couple of
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1

dates when it came to the trustee sale.

2

remember correctly,

3

the property was sold in March;

If I

you said that you were told
is that correct?

4

A

Correct.

5

Q

You were told i t by who that it was sold

6

in March?

7

I want to say ReconTrust.

A

8

Bank of America or ReconTrust.

9

on a

10

a

three-way phone call,

When we had them

they would not agree to

sale date.

11

MR.

De HAAN:

Your Honor,

12

record,

13

hearsay as well.

14

and neither is Bank of America,

15

allegedly said I

I'd like to make an

MR.

16

17

It was either

Again,

objection as to

ReconTrust is not a party
so what ever they

think is hearsay.

BARLOW:

Well,

statement against interest,
THE COURT:

18

just for the

its,

in fact,

a

Judge.

But the interest -- i t ' s a

19

statement not against the defendant.

20

is a statement against someone who's not here,

21

so I

22

hearsay.

23

BY MR.

24

Q

25

An interest

am going to sustain that objection.

and

That's

BARLOW:
So you were aware of a

sale that was

supposed to have occurred in March.
MARY BETH COOK, CSR, RPR
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l

any other sale dates that you were aware of?

2
3

Let me turn your attention to Exhibit

Q

No.

2.

6
7

THE COURT:

He doesn't have that.

I've

got it.
MR.

8

9

I

don't know the correct word.

4

5

All others were not carried through.

A

those,

BARLOW:

Do you have copies of

Judge?

10

THE COURT:

11

you have one I

12

appreciate it.

just gave him mine.

could follow along with,

MR. BARLOW:

13

I

If

I'd

In the folder that I

gave

14

you -- I don't have them marked -- there's a

15

stapled -- this is the front page of the stapled

16

section,

17

sorry,

18

to which is Exhibit 2.

and then if you turn to page 4 -- I'm

page 5 is the exhibit that we're referring

THE COURT:

19
20

BY MR.

21

Q

Thank you.

So go ahead.

BARLOW:
If you look down at the paragraph that

22

starts with "Whereas ReconTrust Company" and then

23

you follow that down,

24

place of the sale as January 14 th at 1:00 p.m.

25

Were you aware of that date prior to

it says that the time and

MARY BETH COOK, CSR, RPR
(435)
161 South 200 West
Cedar City,

A-50

868-1075
UT 84720

32

1

that date?

2

be a sale on your home conducted prior to

3

January 14 th ?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

Were you aware that the sale date was

6

GP

Were you aware that there was going to

J-anuary 14th?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

And how were you aware of that?

9

A

On this sale date I

10

taped to my garage door.

11

Q

On January 14 th ?

12

A

I'd say it was a

13

actually got this

few days before.

I

don't remember the exact date.

14

Q

However,

you mentioned a

couple other

15

dates that came to mind.

16

the property -- you were unaware of the actual

17

sale date;

18
19

A

We were told by the Bank of Amerjca that

MR.

21

question.

22

I

23

sale date.

25

is that correct?

it did not sell on that date.

20

24

So you were unaware that

DeHAAN:

I'm going to object to the

I think that's been asked and answered.

think his testimony was that he was aware of the

MR.

BARLOW:

I

was trying to find out

exactly when he became aware of the sale date,
MARY BETH COOK, CSR, RPR
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1

Judge.
Tf-1 F: CO UR T :

/.
3

sometime before that date,
BARLOW:

4

MR.

5

THE COURT:

6
7

And when he became aware was

BY

MR.

right?

That's correct.
Okay,

then go ahead.

BARLOW:

Q

Now I'd like to draw your attention up

8

to the very top of this document three lines down

9

from the top.

The first

line is doc ID and then

10

trustee's deed and then the county recorder,

11

then the fourth

12

document was re corded.

13

the date on which this document was recorded?

14

you see that?

15

was recorded?

line is the date on which this
Will you please tell us
Do

What's the date that this document

16

A

4/5 of 2010.

17

Q

So this document was recorded on

18

April 5 th of 2010 which is approximately four

19

months after the sale date;

20

A

Correct.

21

Q

Now,

22

and

is that correct?

you still occupy the home;

is that

correct?

GiJ

23

A

Correct.

24

Q

Are you paying the HOA fees on the home?

25

A

Correct.
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1

Q

Is that correct?

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

Have you attempted since the sale to

4

negotiate with any party for a modification?

5

A

Since the sale?

6

Q

Yeah.

You stated

I'm

just trying to

7

clarify this

8

were s t i l l working with Bank of America and also

9

the company that took $3,700.

10

in my notes.

You stated that you

Correct.

Fortified Financial.

A

We were

11

told that the sale in January on January 14 th

12

did not happen,

13

modification at that point.

14

our eviction notice on April 1 st

15

to a surprise to us.
MR.

16

and we continued with the loan
So when we received

Again,

DeHAAN:

'

2010,

it came

Your Honor,

to the statement.

I'm

Any statement

17

going to object

18

indicating what Bank of America told him is

19

hearsay.

20

THE COURT:
sure that

I

agree it is hearsay,
And I

know I've

21

I'm not

22

hit you cold,

23

what was happening before and after the sale.

24

BY MR.

25

Q

Mr.

i t ' s relevant.
Barlow.

I

and

wanted some idea of

BARLOW:
Did you continue to pay the HOA fees
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1

the property?

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

And then what have you done also to

4 protect your interest in the property?
5

Have you

fiJ.ed any other litigation?

6

Not with this property.

A

Well,

7

beforehand we had litigation with Bank of America

8

but.
Q

10

of the

federal

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

In your name;

13

A

Correct.

14

Q

So you're a party to a

15

1

guess the question is,

9

suit?

is that correct?

A

Correct.

17

Q

And then

give me a

THE COURT:

Counsel,

18

litigation initiated;

20

MR.

21

THE COURT:

22

23

federal

BARLOW:

second.
when was that

do you know?

I can find the date.
Approximately.

If either

counsel.
MR.

DeHAAN:

Counsel,

2~

that case if you'd prefer.

25

November 5,

2010.

I

have a docket of

It was filed

The case is 2:10-CV-01099.
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action

against Bank of America and ReconTrust?

16

19

are you aware
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THE COURT:

1

the date.

3

BY MR.

4

Q

5

Exhibit No.

6

consider this deed to be valid,

7

deed?

Let me turn your attention again to
2

MR.

DeHAAN:

THE COURT:

10

MR.

13

Honor.

14

now,

BARLOW:

It calls for

a conclusion of

I

understand that,
that

I

Your

have right

Your Honor.
THE COURT:

question.

17

payments on the

One final

loan since you fell behind?

THE WITNESS:

18

All right.

Have you made any efforts to make

16

I

have not since I

was

told that they wouldn't accept them.
THE COURT:

20

And have you paid the taxes

on the property?
THE WITNESS:

22
23

escrow,

24

been able to.

25

Your Honor.

Objection,

That's all the questions

15

21

this trustee's

so I'm going to sustain the objection.

12

19

Do you

which is the trustee's deed.

No.

A

law,

just wanted

BARLOW:

9

11

I

Thanks.

2

8

'\IJ0

Thank you.

so I

They were included in the

would have loved to,

THE COURT:

but I

have not

Does counsel know if there's
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1

been any tax sale initiated by the county for

2

failure

to pay taxes?
MR.

3

DeHAAN:

I'm unaware if there's been

4 a tax sale or a tax notice regarding the unpaid
5

taxes.
THE COURT:

6
7

I

have.

And so.
MR.

8

9

That's really all

BARLOW:

May I

ask a

follow-up

question?

10

THE COURT:

Sure.

11

BY MR.

12

Q

13

effort

14

you you couldn't make a payment.

15

upon that a

16

A

BARLOW:
Your Honor asked you if you had made any
You stated that they told

to make payment.

Will you expand

little bit.

Basically if

I made a payment it

17

wouldn't do anything to better my case or assist

18

me in getting a

19

in time I

20

of when you're going through the loan modification

21

program it can mess up the numbers,

22

advised me not to.

was told not to make a payment because

23

MR.

BARLOW:

24

THE

COURT:

25

/

/

At one point

loan modification.

All right,
Mr.

DeHaan,

thank you.
go ahead.

I
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1
2

BY MR.

3

Q

De HAAN:

Just one followup question,

4

I

5

in December 2 0 0 8;

Mr.

Adamson.

understand your testimony you missed a payment
is that correct?

6

A

Correct.

7

Q

And then have you -- and then you've not

8

made any payments since that date,

9

I

A

10
11

have not.

MR.
questions,

DeHAAN:

Thank you.

No further

Your Honor.

12

THE COURT:

13

step down unless Mr.

14

questions.

15

correct?

All right,

thanks.

You can

Barlow has any more

We really now -- based on that,

do you

16

have any more evidence that you would like to

17

present?

18

isn't

I think mostly i t ' s legal argument,

it?

19

MR.
would,

BARLOW:

however,

Judge,

20

I

21

would allow me,

22

well,

23

submit this to the Court,

24

Sundquist case.

25

of this case.

it is oral argument.

like to present,

if the Court

I'd like to present evidence of

it would be oral argument,

l 'd

This

and I

would

the Fannie Mae v

like the Court to take notice
is directly to the point that
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